Hizra Islamî ya Siyasî ya Modern, “Islamîtî” û Neteweperwerî

Hizra Islamî ya Siyasî ya Modern, “Islamîtî” û Neteweperwerî

KAMAL SOLEIMANI – JI ÎNG: FEXRIYA ADSAY

Em dixwazin bi bikaranîna îslamê xizmeta Îranê bikin û birêz Xumeynî dixwaze bi bikaranîna Îranê xizmeta îslamê bike.
– Mehdi Bazargan1

Ti dîn ne heqîqî ye. Dînek encax dikare reel be, yanê muqabilî ew tiştê ku ew bixwe dide xuyakirin û jê xuya dibe.
– Karl Barth2

Çawa vebêjim serpêhatiya “Dîn”3 û welêt, Gotin tuneye bo vê rewşa dijwar. Lewma nexweş nekeve ger ji ber rêbazên te be,
Hez dikim ew rojên berê yên xweş vejînim.
– Muhammad Iqbal4

Netewe [yek ji ew] têgehên cîhana modern e ku herî zêde ew nehatiye teorîzekirin
– Partha Chatterjee5

Puxte: Ev gotar destnîşan dike ku ne neteweperwerî ne jî dîn dikare bi serê xwe bên lêkolandin û têkiliya navbera “îslamîtî” û neteweperweriyê teorîze bike. Ez îdia dikim îslamîtî nikare ji netewe-dewletê wêdetir sistemeke siyasî tesewur bike û xuya ye sînorên siyasî yên rabêja netewe-dewletê dahundirandiye. Dahundirandineke bi vî awayî jî li fahma îslamî ya têgehên umet û ‘gerdûnxwaz’iyê (universalist) jî bandor dike. Ev xebata min bi israr bala xwe dide ser peywenda analîza şîroveyên dînî. Di hizra dînî de digel hêmanên berdewamiyê, bandorên peywendê pratîka şîroveya dînî vediguherîne û mohra taybetîtiya demkî (temporal specificity) lê dixe. Muhammad Iqbal (1877 –1938) demekê diyar kiribû ku “ji ber vê peywira misilmanekî modern pir girîng e. Lazim e ew temama sîstema îslamê bêyî ku bi temamî ji rabirdûyê veqetîne ji nû ve hizir bike.” Lê jinûvehizirkirin ne tiştekî bi serê xwe ye û nîşaneyên hevbandoriya bi peywendên civakî-dîrokî re di xwe de dihewîne; di serdema neteweperweriyê de hizra dînî bi qasî ku ji peywenda xwe bandor digre ji peywenda wê jî bandor digre. Ev diyalektîk xwe wek beramberî û têkelbûna berdêlvan (mutual entanglement) xuya dike. Di vê nivîsê de, ez li ser van beramberî û bêrdêlvaniyên neteweperwerî û îslamîtiyê disekinim.

Destpêk

Di vê gotarê de ez li ser bandora neteweperweriyê ya li ser hizra îslamî ya modern disekinim. Bi vî awayî, min gotara xwe kir du beş. Di ya yekem de, bi riya mînakên dîrokî nîşan didim di dawiya sedsala 19mîn û destpêka sedsala 20mîn de rabêja neteweperwer çawa hêdî hêdî dinizile nav şîroveyên nû yên îslamê. Nîqaş dikim ku şîroveyên îslamî her diçe vederker (exclusionary) dibe. Gelek nivîskar û ramangerên tirk û ne-tirk bo misilmanekî heqîqî pîvanên xwe danîne.6 A rast, tenê di peywenda neteweperweriyên misilman ên dijber de mirov dikare gotinên neteweperwer ên vejînerên ereb wek Muhammed ‘Abdul (1849-1905) û Rahman el-Kawakibi (1855-1902) fam bike.

Li dijî vê paşxaneyê bû ku el-Kawakibi îdia dikir ku xwîna erebên Hîcazê wek ên din neguheriye û xira nebûye û ji ber vê tenê ew guncav in bo serokatiya cîhana misilman. Dupatek bi vî awayî derbarê xwînê de, îdiayeke nixumandî bo Qureyşiyên heqîqî -Xwedê giravî xwediyên heqîqî yên xelîfetiyê ne- di nav misilmanan de peydabûn û îstilaya siyaseta etno-neteweperwer destnîşan dikir.7

Beşa duyem a vê gotarê bo tespîtkirina ku “îslamîtî” nikare di nav sîstemeke siyasî ya ji netewe-dewletê wêdetir bifikire, terxan dikim. Ez dibêjim îslamiyan fikra sînorên siyasî yên neteweyî dahundirandine. Dahundirandineke ku bandor li pênaseya têgehên umet û ‘gerdûnxwazî’yê jî dike.

Vejîna îslamî ya modern û peywenda wê ya civakî-dîrokî

Di hizra dînê misilmantiya modern de, netewe jixwe heye, eşkere ye: ji ber ku aktorê dînî di nav paradigmaya neteweperweriyê de tevdigere, meyl dike terza îfadeya wê ya dînî bi ya neteweperweriyê ve girêbide. Jiyana di nav ‘paradigmaya neteweyî’8de awayê hizirkirineke modern a neteweyî ferz dike, û dike ku aktorê neteweperwer terza îfadeyên neteweperwer bo ravekirina nêzikbûna xwe ya bo neteweyê bi kar bîne.9 Ev paradigma pêdiviyên xwe li ser şîroveyên dînî ferz dike, û wek peywendeke jinûvehizirkirina dîn kar dike, herwiha bandor li asoya wê û sînorên wê dike.

Pêdiviyên paradigmatîk ên wisa divê bo kelijîna dîn û neteweperweriyê wek zemînên girîng bên hizirkirin. Ji ber heman sedemê, heweskariya misilmanên modern a bo peydakirina rêbazên demokratîk di serdema zêrîn de divê di nav vê peywendê de bê dîtin. Hewldanên wan î bo jinûvesazkirina rabirdûya dînî jî dibe ku meyla wan bêtir li ser çêkirina rabirdûyeke bikaribe bi dewleta modern re li hev be, ne ku ji dil lobî bikin bo jinûve-nasandina ‘misilmantiya resen.’ Nêrînên misilmanên modern ên derbarê dewletê de, jihev-veqetîna hêzan û rêbazên rêvebirinê, wek ku di paragrafa jêr de hatiye bimînakkirin, tenê vê meylê destnîşan dikin:

Dema serî li niha, rabirdûya dîrokî û dewra çar xelîfeyan didin, piştî hûrnêrînekê ji me ve xuya dibe ku di wê dewrê de sîstema siyasî ya serwer -heta radeyeke mezin- bala xwe daye qaideya jihev-veqetîna hêzan. Di wê heyamê de zagonçêkirin hatibû spartin bo “lijneyeke hiqûqzanên ku ji darêzgeriya zagonî serbixwe bûn.” Xelîfe, wek serokdewlet, ne pîsporek bû di warê şerietê de; ji dêvla wê, erka wî -ya sereke- bi bicîanîna zagonan û rêvebirinê sînorkirî bû. Ew ên xwedî hêzek serbixwe bûn dadger bûn. Xelîfe û rêvebirên wî tabîî wê bûn, wek her kesekî din (îtalîk aîdî min in, K.S.). 10

Gelemperîkirin û xeletiyên dîrokî li aliyekî, di paragrafa jor de, têgeha dewleta modern li ser rabirdûyê tê ferzkirin an rabirdû bi têgeha modern re tê lihevanîn. Netewe-dewleta modern dibe pîvana jinûvexwendina dîroka rêvebiriya misilman. Ev xwendina ku di îdiaya yekşêwe û berdewamiyê de ye dişibe dîroknûsiya neteweperweriya prîmordial. Ji ber vê, lazim e bê destnîşankirin ku mirov nikare ne neteweperwerî ne jî hizra dînî ya îslamiya modern bi tenayî li ser bixebite.

Vejîneriya îslamî hewleke jinûvesazkirina rabirdûyê ye –rabirdûyeke ku him xizmeta niha bike him ji niha re meydan bixwîne. Vejîneriya îslamî, tevî awayên wê yên cihê yên dîrokî, li hemberî têgînkirinên hemdem ên îslamê helwestên tezat nîşan daye. Rexnelêgirtina li misilmanên modern ji ber dûrketina wan a ji ‘misilmantiya resen’ bûye kakilê îdiayên vejînerên îslamî. Îdiayên bi vî rengî bêyî ku haya wan jê hebe vê rastiyê jî tesdîq dikin ku zanîna dînî an şîroveyên derbarê îslamê de beşek ji hewlên mîrovî ne û lewma her dem îzafî ne û bi peywendê ve girêdayî ne. Şîroveyên vejîner jî ne îstisnayeke vê qaideyê ye. Lê, şêweyên modern ên vejînerî an ‘îslamîtî’ye îdia dikin ku peyama resen, di halê xwe xwerû de, dikare ji nû ve bê bidestxistin. Varyasyonên îslamî eşkere ne di îdiaya xwe ya bo gihiştina taybet a bo wateya resen. 11 Têgeha fundamentalizm jî -digel pênasekirina wê ya gewherxwaz û pêjdaraz- bi îronî îdiaya vegera bo têgihiştina resen bo “qaideyên bingehîn” di xwe de dihewîne. Bi giştî, boçûnên vî rengî di xwezaya derveyî peywendê ya dîn de hûrgilî û berfirehiya (şumûlbûn) baweriyê nîşan didin.

Şîroveyên dînî nikare ji şertên dîrokî û peywendên xwe yî civakî-siyasî bên veqetandin. A rast, xwendineke serveyî ya berhemên zanyarên dînî yên dawiya sedsala 19mîn meyla nijadî û etnîk a berbiçav eşkere dike. Lewma, bandorên etnîk ên li ser şîroveyên dînî jî dibe ku berdewamî û taybetîtiya peywendê mecbûr dike. Wek mînak, vejînerên misilman ên ne-tirk derbarê xelîfe û siyaseta wê de bêbiryar in. Bebiryariya wan ji ber hestên wan î neteweyî û dînî ye û ketiye rengê hestên antî-kolonyal. Herwiha, şîroveyên vejîneran di heman demê de di bin bandora rewşa neteweyî, modernîst, û civak, siyaset û çanda antî-kolonyal de cereyan dikir.

Vêga pirs ev e, di cîhana îslamê de gelo neteweperwerî bixwe di gewherê xwe de sekuler e an na. Dîrokê de, hizra dînî her tim marûzî gelek şîroveyan maye. Dînê îslamê jî ne îstisnaya vê qaîdeyê ye, û ew baweriya ku komên cuda yên etnîk ku ji aliyê Xwedê ve hatine tercîhkirin an gelê Wî yê hilbijartî ne hin ji van şîroveyan e. Ji ber vê, pir zehmet e mirov xwendinên neteweyî yê îslamê li derve bihêle ji ber ku “Bi qasî şertên ku îslamê li ser piya dihêle ewqas cureyên îslamiyetê hene.”12 Her wiha xebera antropolog Talal Asad e ku ‘dîn’ nikare pênaseyek wê ya gerdûnî bê kirin, lazim e “em guh bidin kesên jê bawer dikin ka ew çawa pênase dikin.”13 Lê zehmet e mirov bi Asad re hemfikir be dema dibêje “her çiqas di dîroka hemdem a Rojhilata Navîn de îslamîtiyê her tim daye dû neteweperweriya ereb, û rasterast xitabî netewe-dewletê dike jî, divê wek awayekî neteweperweriyê neyê dîtin.”14 Asad dema dibêje îslamîtî ne sekuler e rast e15, îdiaya wî ya bêbal ku dibêje “neteweperwerî di eslê xwe de sekuler e” problematîk e.16

Nêrîna Asad ji ber çend sedeman lêhûrbûnekê heq dike. Divê destnîşan bikim ku ew argumenta xwe dispêre pênaseya xwe ya têgeha umetê, ku vejandina wê armanca talî ya îslamîtiyê ye.17 Li gor Asad, ew awayê ku umet pê tê tesewurkirin îslamîtiyê ji meylên neteweyî, wek erebyetî, cuda dike. Asad îdia dike ku erebyetî umetê wek umeta ereban (el-‘arabiyye) -civateke siyasî- texeyul dike. Herwiha diyar jî dike ku ev civata siyasî ya muxayel cuda ye ji “mekaneke ji aliyê teolojîk ve hatiye pênasekirin ku derfet dide misilmanan [ên serdema navîn] li dinyayê wacibeyên dîn bi cî bînin.”18 Xwendina Asad him bandora dîrokî ya neteweperweriya ereb li ser îslamîtiyê û him meylên neteweperwer ên niha di şîroveya vejîner a ereb-îslamiyan a bo umetê, nabîne. Rast e ku îslamîtî bi “kevneşop”ê re elaqeya wê heye. Lê, bi qewlê Katherine Ewing, kevneşop di nav “nerîna moderniteyê” re derbas bûye.19 Mirov dikare komên vejîner ên mislimanan wek ew ên ku dixwazin “serdema niha ji nû ve şîrove bikin bi riya jinûvenirxandin û jinûvesazkirina rabirdûyê ku bi peywenda modern re guncav be.”20 Lewma, di xwendina Asad a peywenda modern de ku ev girêdanên “kevneşop”ê çêdikin tê ihmalkirin.

A din, xwe-cudakirina etnîk herî zêde di vejîneriya misilmanên ereb de berceste bûye. Ji aliyê dîrokî ve, vejînerên ereb misilmanên ne-ereb wek yek ji sedemên “xi rabûn” an “qirêjbûn”a (inhitat) îslamê dîtine.21 Piranî di islamiyetê de rola ne-ereban bi awayekî neyênî nîqaş kirine. Îmaya etnîk a ravekirinên wisa eşkere ye, ji ber ku vejînerên ereb “nepakbûn”a têgihiştina ne-ereban a misilmantiyê bi karakterên wan î etnîk û bi dîroka wan ve girêdidin.22 Wek mînak, Muhammad ‘Abduh, vejînerê îslamî yê navdar î misrî qet teredud nake dema dibêje “ji ber ku tirk dereng bûne misilman, nikaribûne ruhê îslamê fam bikin.”23 Dibêje desthilata tirkên osmanî “xwerûbûna (khulus) zimanê erebî xira kiriye û di nav misilmanan de bûne sedema lihevnekirin û terîqetparêziyê.”24

Li gor fikra ‘Abduh di navbera zimanê erebî û îslamê de girêyek organîk heye. “Qirêjbûn”a ya yekem, li gor ‘Abduh, bûye sedema “hilweşîn”a ya duyem. ‘Abduh di berhema xwe ya sala 1902 de, al-Islam wa al-Nasraniyya, îdia dike ku “îslam [di eslê xwe de] dînê ereban e.” Lê biryara xelîfeyê abasî “bo afirandina artêşeke biyanî ku ji tirk, deylemî û xelkê din [ne-ereb] pêk tê… îslam jixwe dûr xist –an biyanî kir… ew [dîn] guherand kir ne-ereb (‘ecem).”25 Tenê ‘Abduh wisa nedifikirî. Ji aliyê vejînerên din î îkonîk jî, el-Kawakibi û Rashid Rida (1865-1935) jî tê de, şîroveyên manend dikirin.26 Heta Hassan el-Benna (1906 – 1949), damezrênerê Biratiya Misilman, carekê îlan kiribû ku “em înkar nakin ku neteweyên cuda taybetmendiyên xwe û karakterekî xwe yî manewî yê cuda heye [lê] em bawer dikin ji van aliyan ve para mezintirîn û bêkêmasî ya ereban e…”27

Berovajî fikra Asad, xuya ye pênaseya umetê ya vejîneran ji neteweperwerên ereb zêde cudatir tiştekî nabêje.28 Li vir divê bê destnîşankirin ku jinûvepênasekirina umetê gelekî di bin tesîra têkoşîna antî-kolonyal a dawiya sedsala 19mîn û destpêka sedsala 20mîn de têkoşîneke ku şikil daye xwe-têgihiştina misilmanên modern û kiriye ku vejîner hemû alema misilman wek bitunek siyasî-dînî bibîne li hemberî Rojavaya kolonyal a xiristiyan. Ligel vê, gotinên misilmanên ereb ên vederker û etno-dînî derbarê xelîfe de derfet dida umet di nav sînorên etnîk û siyasî de bê sêwirandin.29

Bi rastî, nivîsên vejînerên misliman, wek ên el-Kawakibi dibin mînakên veneqetînbariya îdiayên îslamî û neteweperwerên ereb ên bo xelîfetiya dawiya sedsala 19mîn û destpêka sedsala 20mîn. El-Kawakibi îdia dike ku hemû misliman wek destpêka îslamiyetê wê bikevin dû xelîfeyekî ereb. Li gor wî, ev rast e ji ber ku bawer dike “ji hemû komên etnîk, ereb ên zêdetirîn biwesf in (ansab) ku lazim e wek kaniya [resen] dîn (marja‘an fi al-dini) bên dîtin û bo hemû misilmanan bibin rol model (qudwa).”30 Di nivîsên el-Kawakibi de fama etnîk a umetê têra xwe eşkere dibe dema mislimanan wek umam (bi awayê pirhejmar) polîn dike.31 Lewma, îlan dike ku “ti neteweyê misliman (umam al-Islamiya) bi qasî erebên Nîvgiravê ne bi hewes in bo parastina serxwebûn û azadiya xwe.”32 El-Kawakibi îdia dike erebî ne tenê zimanê yekemîn (khusus) î yek ji sê parên gelheya mislimanên cîhanê ye, ew zimanê wan î zêdetirîn berbelav (‘umum) û dewlementirîn e.33 Bo berevaniya mafê taybet ê ereban bo xelîfetiyê, el-Kawakibi çendîn taybetmendiyên “payebilind” ên neteweyî yên ereban dijmêre, û dibêje ew “yekemîn umma ne ku prensîbên istişareyê tetbîq bikin.”34 Jê wêdetir, bal dikşîne ku ereb “ummaya zêdetirîn amade ne al-ishtrakiya35 (wekhevîtî) bi cî bînin…”36 û zêdetirîn dilxwaz in bo rûmetdayina peymanên xwe.”37

El-Kawakibi pir zelal dibêje bicîanîna peyama Pêxember û vejîna îslamiyetê tenê bi riya damezrandina xelîfetiya ereb gengaz e.38 Di wê baweriyê de ye jî ku xelifeyekî ereb ancax dikare rizgariya (falah) ereban pêk bîne.39 Her wiha, el-Kawakibi ji helbestvanê ereb ê serdema navîn neqil dike ku dibêje “xelk girêdayî milukê xwe ne [bo her serkeftinê] û wê ti carî di bin hukimdariya milukên ne-ereb de xilasiya ereban pêk neyê.”40

Divê bê destnîşankirin ku pirtûka el-Kawakibi di nav vejînerên misilman ên ereb de gelekî populer e. Ewqas populer e ku Sammi Dahhan, yek ji jiyannamenûsê el-Kawakibi, dibêje pirtûk “ji aliyê Abduh an Rida -du kesayetên vejîner ên navdeng- ve hatiye revîzekirin.”41 Li gor el-Kawakibi, îslam û ereb nikare ji hev bên veqetandin. Tenê gelê ereb dikare “hilweşîna şaristaniya îslamî” ku tirk û gelên din î ne-ereb bûne sedem, bide sekinandin. Di eslê xwe de,

berevaniya el-Kawakibi ya şaristaniya îslamê payebilindkirina ereban bû di geşbûna vê şaristaniyê de. Fezîletên îslamê -zimanê wê, Pêxemberê wê, nîzama wê ya exlaqî û siyasî ya destpêkê de- serkeftinên ereban in. Bi nêrîna wî, paşveçûna îslamê ji ber kirinên tirk û gelên din î ne-ereb bûye ku ketine nav umetê, û heyfa xwe lê tîne ku tirk bûne misilman… el-Kawakibi bang li osmaniyan dike ku dev ji dawa xelîfetiyê berdin û vî meqamî radestî xwediyên wê yên heq, yanê ereb, bikin.42

Rabêja xelîfetiyê di dawiya mayî ya alema sunî de piranî zanîna xwe ji fikrên antî-kolonyal werdigirt, û ji ber vê car bi car bi xwe re fikra piştevaniya osmaniyan dianî. Lê, bo ereban xelîfetî têgeheke li derveyî vê helwestê bû.43 Her wiha, dawiya sedsala 19mîn û destpêka sedsala 20mîn de, di nav ereban de fahma têgehên wek umet û xelîfeyê ji yên suniyên din bêtir rengekî wan î etnîk hebû. Boçûneke bi vî rengî bo vejandina vê saziyê, bi pêşengtiya xelîfeyekî ereb, bertekên têkel ên van şexsiyet û komên misliman wek ‘Abduh, Rida û Vahabî yên li hemberî kolonyalîzma ewropî dikare ronî bike. Ji ber tirsa ku îdiaya wan têk bibe -heta dema li hemberî kolonyalîzma ewropî aliyê osmaniyan digirtin jî- him neteweperwer him vejînerên ereb bêdil bûn xelîfetiya osmanî meşrû bibînin.44

Şaş e ku mirov hizir bike piştî mirina Xelîfeyê çaremîn di sala 656ê de, misilmanan her tim umeteke yekreng texeyul kirine. Ev rast e ku di serdema navîn de misilmanan bawer nedikirin ku civata wan temamî civateke siyasî ye.45 Belkî tenê çend dehsal piştî mirina Pêxemberê misilmanan rêvebiriya siyasî ket destê du hevrikên siyasîyek navenda wê li Medîneyê û ya din li Şamê. Peydabûna navendên hevrik ên hukimdariyê bû destpêka parçebûna mislimanan a bêdawî -ev parçebûn, di sedsalên pey re, rehendên wê yên nû çêbûn û hê mezintir bûn. Lê, îxtilafa mislimanan bi awayekî cuda hat şîrovekirin. Heta hedîs jî (gotinên pêxember, yj. hadith, pj.ahadith), qe nebe ji aliyê teolojîk ve wek pîrozkirina (rahmahtun) Xwedê, bo rewakirina ixtilafên nav umetê hatin bikaranîn.46 Şîroveyên bi vî rengî47 bi temamî bêbingeh bûn, bi giştî ji înkarkirina pêwistiya dewletê bigre heta rewakirina hevhebûna du dijberên siyasî di nav civatê, rêz dibûn. Piraniya suniyan amade bûn qebûl bikin ku piştî çar xelîfeyan (Xwedê giravî Khulfah al-Rashidun, an Xelîfeyên Rêberiya Rast) hedîs bi temamî meşruiyeta hemû milûkan red dike.48 Li gor heman hedîsê, piştî wê civata misliman wê ji aliyê milûkên zorbe an bêdad (‘adud)49 bên îdarekirin.50

Mirov çiqas dupat bike têr nake ku fikrên vejandina umetê û xelîfeyê rastîn bi hilatina neteweperwerî û antî-kolonyalizma di cîhana misilmanan de çawa li hev aliqîne, diyardeyeke ku ser peywenda dîrokî ya hevpar a neteweperweriya ereb û vejîneriya îslamî kişif dike. Di nav du sedsalên borî de, vejîna îslamî bûye awayekî ku misilmanên modern nîgeraniyên xwe formule dikin. Vejîneriya îslamî, bi xwe şêwazên wê yên curbecur hene, bi cureyên cuda yên neteweperweriyên etnîk, erdnigarî û hokarên din î peywendbar ve dihat barkirin. Ji destpêkê ve, vejîneriya îslamî bixwe di fikara rêvebiriyeke pêbawer û resen de bû, bi taybetî jî li hemberî gefa kolonyal. Lê, ev nebû asteng ku neteweperwerî bi hêsanî binizile nav rabêja îslamiya modern a vejîner.

Dawiya sedsala 19mîn û destpêka 20mîn de, ereban rabêja xelîfetiyê ji misilmanên din zêdetir “etnîsîze” kirin. Lê, hewce nake mirov bêje di temama cîhana misilman de fikra xelîfetiyê her diçû bêtir hêz ji neteweperweriyê digirt. Di 1924ê de hilweşandina xelîfetiya osmanî ev meyla hevpar a di nav misilmanan de kişif kir. Çiqas komên cuda yên misilman hewl didan rabêja nostaljîk a xelîfetiyê zindî bihêlin jî, di heman demê de heta ji wan dihat pêşekî didan sînorên xwe yî neteweyî bo xelifetiya îslamê.51 Îltimasên neteweyî yên vî rengî di yekem konferansa bo vejîna xelîfetiyê ya di 1926ê de li Qahireyê encam dan. Di konferansê de “her şandeya beşdar xwest hukimdarê xwe bike xelîfe.”52 Yanê, damezrandina xelîfetiyê di eslê xwe de ne gerdûnî bû. Ger ew wek bercestkirina dewleta rastîn a îslamî bûya jî, komên îslamî, bi giştî, afirandina xelîfetiyeke muhtemel di nav warên xwe yî mewcûd û lokal, neteweyî de disêwirandin. Ev girîng e mirov li ber çav bigre ka ev komên ku wek fundamantalîst an îslamî tên binavkirin jî sînorên dewleta netewe-dewletê dahundirandine an na.

Îslamîtî, neteweperweriya banal û netewe-dewlet

Manewraya îslamiyan a di nav sînorên netewe-dewletê de û armanca wan a stratejîk bo kontrolkirina binemayên dewletê ew mecbûr kirin ku bi çendîn awayan bi neteweperweriyê re mijûl bibin. Helbet, îslamîtî ne neteweperwerî ye, ger neteweperwerî di eslê xwe de sekuler bê tesewurkirin. Lê, wek ku Partha Chaterjee dibêje neteweperwerî dikare têgeheke pêkhatî be û ji bo bi orf û adetên çandî yên herêmî re li hev bike têkeve şiklên cuda, eleqeya wê ya bi neteweperweriyê têkeltir e.

Hewldanên îslamiyan ku bi saya netewe-dewletê kar dike bixwe dibe zemîna kelijîna dîn û siyasetê, ku ji aliyê “berjewendiyên neteweyî” tê xwedîkirin. Dewleta modern ne bi temamî dîn ji qada giştî rakir, ne ew di siyasetê de qedexe kir, ne jî li hemberî dîn bû guhnedêr an bêalî. Netewe-dewleta modern her daîm dîn îdare kir, ji nû ve li ser fikirî, û bi neqandinê hin wechên dîn daxilî xwe kir an ji xwe dûr xist. Lê muameleya dewletê a bi dîn(an) re di nav çarçoveya rejimeke legal (yanê sekulerî) de bû, û ji ber vê şîroveya dewletê ya derbarê dîn de bendîkar bû. Ger mirov çav li axaftina tîr a dînî ya îslamiyan bigerîne, ferq dike him îslamî him ne-îslamî di îdarekirina dîn de stratejiyên manend hebandine. Dewlet çi îslamî be çi neteweyî be şîroveya dînî dike pawana (monopoly) xwe. Pawankirineke wisa an bi riya guhnedan an bi temamî cezakirina şîroveyên dînî yên aktorên ne-dewletî pêk tê. Pratîkên dewletê Îran53, Misir54, Erebistana Siudî û Tirkiyeyê55 yên sî salên dawî de têra xwe mînakên vê didin me.

Îslamiyan îslam ji nû ve şîrove kirin û di nav çarçoveya paradigmaya neteweperweriyê de bi wê re muamele kirin. Bandora pêdiviyên paradigmayeke wisa lazim e neyê sivikkirin. Ger îslamî, wek heta niha nikaribin bêyî netewe-dewletê -wek “awayê îdeal” ê rêvebirina modern- bifikirin, wê bibin rehînek din a ku Billig bi konetî wek “neteweperweriya banal”56 bi nav dike. (Neteweperweriya banal dikare wek tesdîqkirina bêhemdî û berzkirina netewe-dewletê bê famkirin. Bi gotineke din, netewe-dewlet bê îtiraz tê qebûlkirin.) Tişta îslamiyan motîve dike mijûliya wan a bi siyaseta modern re ye an na, ev pirseke talî ye. Li vir mesele ew e ku vizyona siyasî ya îslamiyan ji ya cureyên din î homo nationalisan nikare bê veqetandin. Di îslamîtiyê de jî, wek di awayên din î hizra modern de, sînorên dewletê bi yên neteweyê re li hev diqelibin. Yekî/a îslamî memnûn e ji rewşa xwe ya legal û neteweyî ku ji dawiya mayî ya “umet”a islamê cuda ye û nebendkirî ye.

Normalbûna memnûniyetên vî rengî modern e û neteweyî ye. Ger pênaseyek wisa rast be, ewçax ên îslamî ne li gerdûneke cuda de dijîn ne jî awayekî cuda yê jiyanê disêwirînin an diparêzin ku bikaribe li derveyî çarçoveya netewe-dewleta modern bê bicîkirin. Li gor îslamiyan, wek welatî, qebûlkirina sînorên neteweyî ne dubendiyek e. Ji ber vê ye ku li Îranê farisên misilman ên şiî bi serbilindî, tevî tiştên din, ku divê serokdewlet li Îranê hatibe dinyayê û şiîyê bi eslê xwe îranî be (Iraniul-asl), kirine mecbûriyeteke makezagonî.57 Rastiyeke wisa raberî me dike ku yekî/a îslamî divê wek muadilê xwe yî xiristiyan an cihû wek “homo nationalis”ek bê tesewirkirin. Ligel vê, bi qewlê Balibar, “sînorê derve yê dewletê bûye ‘sînorê hundirîn’ê welatiyan,58 wek ku rastiya hişk a jiyanê ya di paradigmaya neteweyî de îcab dike.

Wek berê jî hat raberkirin, îslamî kêfxweş in ji sînorên netewe-dewletê. Bi gelemperî, ji bilî hin retorîkên derbarê rola kolonyalizmê di ferzkirina sînorên erdnigarî yên niha, lîteratureke girîng tuneye ku raber bike ku dahundirandina sînorên neteweyî dikare bo sedeqeta dîndariya misilmanan bibe pirsgirêk. Tesdîqkirina bêhemdî ya sînorên etnoneteweyî yên heyî û derbirînên neteweyî yên barekirî vê rastiyê destnîşan dikin.59 Li vir tişta lazim e bê dupatkirin, misilmanek, çi kevneşoparêz be çi îslamî be, ne şert e xwe bêdîn bibîne dema sînorên netewe-dewletê tesdîq dike. Takên wisa xwe wek parçeyek ji civata dîndaran ku ji aliyê sînorên etno-neteweyî yên bêdilê wan hatiye parçekirin, nabîne.60

Çend dehsaleyên dawî li çend welatan kontrola desthilatdariya dewletê pêşkêşî îslamiyan kir. Vê derfetê, di çend mînakan de, potansiyela xwenîşandana alternatifa netewe-dewletê dabîn kir. Lê, ne tenê îslamiyan ti rêbazên alternatîf ên rêvebiriyê pêşkêş nekirin; pir eşkere nikaribûn di awayên rêvebiriyê de ciyawaziyeke radikal raber bikin. Wek mînak, dema îslamî desthilatdar bûn hewl dan zagonên neteweyê bêtir bikin dînî, li aliyê din bi temamî têkçûn di rakirina sînordariyên ku ji aliyê komên etnîk ên serdest di nav peywenda neteweyî de hatibûn danîn. Wek mînak, rejima Îranê an hukimeta tirk a nêz-îslamî ne tenê wek dewletên faris û tirk tevgeriyan, lê bi awayekî gewherî di warê temsiliyeta siyasî, çandî û zimanî ya Adinê etnîk de bêtehemuliya wan dewam kir.

Dema îslamî desthilatdar bûn, bi gelek awayî siyaseta neteweyî ya muhafezekar ji nû ve hilberandin. Lê ligel diruşmeyên wan î gerdûnî û dij-rojavayî, nêrînên siyasî yên îslamiyan têra xwe neteweyî ne. Wek hemû netewe-dewletên din, siyaseta karên derve ya dewletên îslamî bi gelemperî ji aliyê “berjewendiyên neteweyî” ve tên diyarkirin. Wek mînak, him rejima Îranê him komên îslamî yên ereb derbarê gelek babetên wêranî de xwedî helwestên cuda ne, ku ji pêwendiyên firehtir ên îslamî bêtir ji aliyê siyaseta lokal ve tên diyarkirin. Wek mînak, komkujiya endamên Biratiya Misilman û mirovên sivîl ên bêberevanî li Hamayê61 têkiliyên dostane yên navbera Îran û Suriyeyê qels nekir; ew xurttir jî kirin. Şerê qirkirinê yên li Balkanan û piştevaniya bêsînor a Rusyayê bo rejima Slobodan Milošević di salên 1990î de qet nebû sedema ku Îran rexne li siyaseta derve ya Rusyayê bigre. Çespandina gelheya misilman li Çînê jî têra xwe ne girîng bû ku li Îranê di çapameniya dewletê de cî bigre.62 Dema dor tê ser misilmanan, li derveyî sînorên xwe yî neteweyî, ev dewlet guhnedêr in an babetên vî awayî re li gor zarûretên banal ên berjewendiyên xwe yî neteweyî muamele dikin.

Xala sereke ev e ku fahma misilmanan a derbarê îslamê de di bin bandora neteweperweriya modern û arezûya kontrolkirina dewletê de ye. Li vir armanc ne ev e ku îslamiyan bi bêsamimiyetê sucdar bike lê armanc ew e ku bê destnîşankirin wan netewe-dewlet “wek cureyek îdeal” pir zêde dahundirandine. Ancax di vê peywendê de mirov dikare gotinên Hassan el-Banna fam bike dema dibêje “ger dema qesta wan bi ‘welatparêzî”yê xurtkirina pêwendiyan be ku şexsan bi welatekî diyar ve girêbide, û raberkirina rêbaza bicîanîna vê xurtkirina berjewendiyên wan be, ewçax di vê babetê de em ligel wan in. Ji ber ku îslam vê wek peywireke dînî ya pêwîst qebûl dike…”63

Nêrîna li welatparêziyê wek peywireke îslamî bixwe nîşaneya kelijîna netewe- perwerî û îslamîtiyê ye di jinûvesazkirina hizra îslamî ya modern de. Belkî ya girîngtir jî hebandina bêqestî ya rêbazên modern e di pênasekirina neteweyê de ji aliyê kesên wek el-Banna, ji ber ku ev diyar dike ku “yên îslamî” nasnameya neteweyî pir zêde pejirandine. Asta bandora neteweperweriyê ya li ser îslamiyên wek el-Banna, dema nêrînên wî bi yên Iqbal re –ku Adinên wî ne-misilman in- bê beramberkirin, dikare bê famkirin.64 Iqbal nîqaş dike ku “hestên welatparêziyê ku hizra neteweyî tîne bîra mirov, cureyek perestiya objeya material e, ev jî li dijî ruhê îslamê ye ku wek protestoyek li hemberî hemû awayên kone û qebe yên putperestiyê peyda bûye.”65

Encam

Nasnameya neteweyî awayekî taybet ê nîşandan an sêwirandina neteweya mirov e. Bi qewlê Billig “xwedîbûna nasnameyeke neteweyî xwedîbûna rêbazên axaftina derbarê netewetiyê ye.”66 Xwedîbûna rêbazên axaftina derbarê netewetiyê diyardeyeke modern e. Wek ku li jor jî hat diyarkirin, aktorê dînî yê modern jî meyl dike neteweyê wek diyardeyeke jixwe-eşkere têbigihê; ji ber ku aktorê dînî di nav paradigmaya neteweperweriya modern de tevdigere, amade ye hişmendiya xwe ya dînî bi ya neteweperwer ve bike yek. Her wiha, ji ber ku paradigmaya neteweperweriyê bo jinûvehizirîna dîn peywendekê çêdike, bandor li jinûveşîrovekirina wê dike û wê xwedî dike. Paşxaneya etnîk û peywendên neteweyî/çandî fahma misilmanê modern a derbarê îslamê de dişêwîne. Bi gelek awayan, di civatên cuda yên misilman de şîrovekirina dînî teqabulî sînorên neteweyên wan î “muxayel” dike. Gelek mislimanên kevneşoparêz û îslamî netewe-dewletên xwe yî heyî bê îtiraz dipejirînin û sînorên xwe yî dînî û dîrokên xwe ji nû ve xêz dikin da ku bi yên neteweya wan re guncav bin.

Fikra sabit a îslamiyan bo desthilatdariya dewletê qasî ku nîşaneya dahundirandina îslamiyan a sînorên neteweyî ye, heman demê de bandora neteweperweriyê li ser hizra misilman a siyasî ye jî. Îslamî dema tên ser desthilatdariyê, mecbûr dimînin gelek fikrên xwe yî mexrûr, “gerdûnî” biterikînin ji ber hewcedariya berjewendiyên banal ên dewletê. Îslamiyên modern ji netewe-dewleta modern bêtir li ser hin zagon û polîtîkayên dewletê nîqaş dikin. Bo yên îslamî, xwezaya dewleta modern hê jî li ser nehatiye fikirîn ji ber ku ew bê îtiraz tê pejirandin. Ên îslamî li dewletê, di awayê wê yê modern de, wek aktorê sereke bo guherîn û kontrolkirina bicîanîna polîtîka û bernameyên xwe yî muhafezekar, dinêrin. Lewma vejîna îslamî ya modern, digel awayên wê yên curbecur, vederker, lokal e û di nav sînorên netewe-dewleta modern de dimîne.

1 Yekem Serokwezîrê piştî şoreşa 1979a, Mehdi Bazargan, Inqlab-E Iran Dar Do Harakat/ Şoreşa Îranê ber bi Du Aliyan ve (Tehran: Mazaheri, 1983), 75.

2 Garrett Green, Theology, Hermeneutics, and Imagination: The Crisis of Interpretation at the End of Modernity (Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 151.

3 Islam an baweriya dînî.

4 Muhammad Iqbal, Armaghan-I Hijaz (1938), http://www.allamaiqbal.com/. Dîtina malperê: 10/01/2016

5 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation, and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Oxford India Paperbacks (Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), xi.

6 Bo bêtir agahî derbarê vê babetê de bnr., Kamal Soleimani, Islam and Competing Nationalism in the Middle East, 1876-1926. (New York: Palgrave, 2016).

7 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura (Cairo: al-Azhar, 1931) 196-97.

8 Bnr. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism. (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995).

9 Bo nîqaşeke berfireh derbarê vê mijarê de bnr. Billig: 1995.

10 Nql. Al-Ṣa‘īdī Al-Tashrī‘ wa-sann al-qawānīnfī al-dawla al-Islāmīya, dirāsataḥlīlīya/ Legislation and the Enactment of Laws in the Islamic State: An Analytical Study, (Cleveland: Dār al-nahḍa al-Islāmīya, 1992) 46-55.

11 Brwb. (Berawird bike). Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, 1st ed. (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981). û The Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics (Indianapolis IN, USA: American Trust Publications, 1991).

12 Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, Phronesis (London; New York: Verso, 1993), 1.

13 Nql. Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 23.

14 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 199.

15 B.n.b., 195.

16 B.n.b.

17 B.n.b., 196-98.

18 B.n.b., 197.

19 Katherine Pratt Ewing, Arguing Sainthood: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and Islam (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006).

20 Andrew Rippin û Jan Knappert, Textual Sources for the Study of Islam, Textual Sources for the Study of Religion (Manchester Greater Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 30. dûpat hatiye lêzêdekirin.

21 Heta Muhammad Iqbal jî xirabûyîna (inhitat) Cîhana Misliman dipejirîne. Yek ji helbestên wî bi sernavê “di dema xirabûyinê de, teqlîd ji îjtihadê çêtir e,” wiha dibêje:

Serdema niha gelek teşqele vedişêre
Di bin serê xwe de; mîzaca wê ya bêsekin
Diherike di nav aloziyan de. Civaka
Miletên qedîm di vê wextên modern de
Di nav sergêjiyê de ne; bêruh bi guliyê jiyanê ve girtiye …

Îstiqrara di nav teqlîda hişk de.
Tu jî bide ser riya bavê xwe, ji ber ku li wir e Aramî; riayet tê wateya
Hevgirtina civatê.
Di payizê de, tu ku bê pel mayî
Wek mêywe ti car ji darê neqete,

Muhammad Iqbal, Rumuz-I Bekhudi wer. Iqbal Academy Pakistan (Iqbal Academy, 1918.http:// www.allamaiqbal.com/ Hat dîtin: 10/01/2016). Divê bê destnîşankirin ku Iqbal ev helbest di sala 1918ê de nivîsandiye. Di berhemên piştî vê salê de, xuya ye zêde girîngî nade riayet/teqlîdê. Wek mînak, di berhema xwe sala 1930î de, Iqbal diyar dike ku “hurmeteke derewîn bo dîrokê û vejandina wê ya sûnî ji bo xirabûna xelkê nabe derman” (dûpat hatiye zêdekirin). Bnr. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 203.

22 Bnr. Muhammad ‘Ammara. Abd al-Rahaman Al-Kawakibi: The Martyr of Islam and Freedom. (Cairo: Daralshuruq, 1988)

23 Hamid ‘Enayat, Seyri Dar Andishay-E Siyasi-Ye Arab/ An Overview of Arab Political Thought (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sohami-ye Kitabha-ye Jibi, 2536), 149.

24 B.n.b.

25 Muhammad ‘Abduh, Al-Islam Wa Al-Nasraniyya/ Islam and Christianity (Cairo: al-Manar, 1323/1905), 123.

26 Brwb. Mahmoud Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd Riḍā’s Ideas on the Caliphate “ Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 2 (Apr. – Jun., 1997). Also, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura (Cairo: al-Azhar, 1931).

27 Hasan al-Banna, “Our Message,” http://www.ymsite.com/books/our_message/index.htm. Hat dîtin: 10/01/2015.

28 Asad tesdîq dike ku umet were wateya “xelkekî” (Formations of the Secular: 197. ) Lê, ev têgeh ji tişta ku Asad wek “şiûra ‘xelkekî’ -di Qur’anê de ‘civatek- bi nav dike” (B.n.b.) zêdetir tişt dihewîne. Di Qur’anê de, civatek misliman jî wek umetê tê pejirandin, Ibrahim –mirovek tenê- jî wek umet tê qebûlkirin (2/143; 21/92; 23/52). Her wiha, komek biçûk a misilman, a cihû û ya xiristiyan jî [(3/104; 7/159; 3/113) berovajî civatên wan î giştî yên cuda], bi têgeha umetê hatine destnîşankirin. Qur’an carna vê têgehê bo pênasekirina kevneşopeke dînî (7/159), û carna bo civateke kesên peyameke nû ya pîroz înkar dikin an dipejirînin jî bi kar tîne (3/113). Merhaleya destpêkê ya jiyana mirovatiyê -ku wek homojeniyeke kolektîf tê fikirîn- jî wek umeteke yekgirtû tê pênasekirin (umma wahida, 43/22 & 23).

29 Bo bêtir agahî bnr., beşa sêyem.

30 Al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura, 196-97.

31 Umam (pirjimar; yekjimar: umma)

32 Al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura, 195.

33 B.n.b.

34 B.n.b., 196.

35 Têgeha el-ishtrakiya di wateya sosyalizmê de tê bikaranîn. Lê li vir xuya ye qesta el-Kawakibi wekhevî ye.

36 Al-Kawakibi, Um Al-Qura, 196.

37 B.n.b.

38 B.n.b., 150-51.

39 B.n.b.

40 B.n.b., 151.

41 Abbas Mahmud Al-Aqqad, ‘Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-’Arabi, 1969), 81.

42 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000), 126.

43 Brw. Al-Aqqad, ‘Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi.

44 B.n.b., 75.

45 See, Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 197.

46 Alimên misliman hê jî li ser vê hedîsê nîqaş dikin. Bnr., http://www.ebnmaryam.com/vb/ t32140.html. Hat dîtin:10/01/2016.

47 Bnr. Soleimani (2016).

48 Bnr. Soleimani (2016).

49 ‘Adud, ji kokpeyva ‘adda tê; wateya wê esil, devlêkirin an bidestxistina tiştekî bi zora diranan. 50 Otorîteyên mezin ên hedîsên sunî wek Terminal û Nisaei vê hedîsê neqil dikin. Bnr., http:// www.dd-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5679. Hat dîtin: 10/01/ 2016

51 Di nav misilmanên Asyaya Başûr de ji bo meseleya ka neteweperwerî çawa dikare di nav tevgera xelîfetiyê de bê bicîkirin, bnr. Adeeb Khalid, “Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and Its Uses,” in Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).

52 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State, Studies in Middle Eastern History (Boston, MA: Brill, 2001), 257.

53 Zextên bênavber ên dewleta Îranê li ser aktorên dînî yên cuda, bi pêşengtiya Shi‘i Maraji‘ (an Ayetullahên Mezin), delîlê vê rastiya nikare bê înkarkirin ku dewlet dixwaze şîrovekirina dînî ya dîn têxe pawana xwe.

54 Serpêhatiyên Nasr Hamid Abu Zayed û Nawal al-Saadawi, li hemberî şîrovekirinên îslamê yên bêdilê dewletê, du mînakên helwesta dewleta sekuler in.

55 Belkî li Tirkiyeyê siyaseta nixumandinê beriya her tiştî bê-alîtiya dewleta ‘sekuler’ a li hemberî dîn kişif kir. Li Tirkiyeyê di nîqaşên berdewam ên derbarê serpoşê de, dewletê bêsekin û her dem îslamîbûna nixumandinê da ber pirsan. Dewlet aliyekî nîqaşê bû, ne ji ber berevaniya wê ya sekuleriyê bû, lê bêtir hewl dida bide zanîn nixumandin tiştekî ne-îslamî ye. Dewleta tirk bi eşekereyî zanyarên îslamî yên nêz-dewlet teşwîq dikirin û piştevaniya wan dikirin ku dînîbûna nixumandinê bidin ber pirsan.

56 Bnr. Billig, 1996.

57 Bnr., Made 115mîn a Makezagona Komara Îslamî ya Îranê. http://www.roshd.ir/Portals/0/ KarAfarini/PDFs/rules/ghanoone_asasy.pdf. Hat dîtin: 10/01/2016.

58 Etienne Balibar û Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class : Ambiguous Identities (London England; New York: Verso, 1991), 95.

59 Ji xeynî Biratiya Misliman û Partiya Ba’s a Iraqê, ti dewletên ereb herêma ereb a li Îranê wek axa ereban a dagirkirî nabînin. Di lîteratura siyasî ya Biratiya Misliman de, ev herêm wek “erebîstana dagirkirî” an ‘Arabstan al-muhtallah (têgeha al-muhtall bi giştî ji aliyê neteweperwerên ereb bo Filistînê bi kar tînin) pênase dikin. Bnr., http://www.ikhwanwiki. com/index.php. Hat dîtin: 10/01/ 2016. Helbet Biratiya Misliman (Ikwan al-Muslimin) di çend dehsaleyên borî de bi rejima Îranê re têkiliyek wê pir têkel hebû. Ev mînak tê destnîşankirin bo binxêzkirina ku di lîteratura komên îslamî de sînorên etnîk û dînî çawa dikare ji xwe ber li hev bialiqin. Di van referansan de neteweperweriya veşartî bêtir eşkere dibe dema Biratiya Misliman (a sunî) li Îranê piştgiriya erebên şiî dike lê ji qedera kurdan re jî, ku piraniya wan sunî ye, bi temamî çavê xwe digre.

Dewleta Îslamî ya Iraq û Levant (ISIL) wek anomaliyek muhtemel û komeke ku ji bandora neteweperweriyê dûr maye xuya dike. Lê, çendîn hoker hene ku nîşan didin berovajiya vê rast e, ji ber ku: a) ISIL bixwe bertekek erebên sunî ye li hember geşedanên ku di dehsalên borî de li Iraq û Sûriyeyê rû dane. Ji ber vê sedemê ye ku efserên ba’sî yên berê marîpişta binemaya leşkerî ya ISILê pêk tînin. 2) Xuya dike peyama gerdûnî divê ji zarûriyetek îdeolojîk bêtir wek amraza peydakirina milîtanên ji çar aliyê cîhanê bê dîtin. Beriya piştgiriya amerîkî ya hewayî bo kurdan sala 2014a de, ISIL li derveyî Iraq û Levantê şer nekiribû. Komên derveyî wir ku tê gotin parçeyek ji ISILê ne, ji kirinên wan îlham digirtin. Ew ne dewama ISILê yê rêkxistinkirî bûn. 3) Zimanê erebî zimanê fermî yê ragihandinê ye û di xwe-têgihiştinê de ciyekî navendî digre, ku karakterê wê yî etnîk diselmîne. 4) Dîsa, ew yekî ne-ereb hêjayî rola xelîfetiyê nabînin.

60 Bo nîqaşeke balkêş derbarê lihevaliqîna sînorên dînî û neteweyî bnr. Philip W. Barker, Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be for Us, Routledge Studies in Nationalism and Ethnicity (London; New York: Routledge, 2009).

61 Komkujiya Hamayê di Sibata 1982ê de pêk hat, dema artêşa Sûriyeyê di fermanên serokê welêt, Hafiz el-Esad, li dijî bajêr operasyonek giran a bejayî da meşand. Pevçûna niha ya li Sûriyeyê û hevalbendîtiyên li dor vê pevçûnê mezintirîn manîfesto ne ku kom û rejimên îslamî li ser hîmê meyl û berjewendiyên neteweyî çawa dabeş dibin. Balkêş e ku Hizbulah, Îran û rejima Beşar Esad hevalbendên Rusyayê ne. Helwesta Tirkiyeyê zêdetirîn ji aliyê bêtehemuliya wê ya bo destkeftiyên siyasî yên kurdan tê diyarkirin û ji ber vê carna dibe hevalbendê Rusyayê, carna dibe yê Siûdî, Qatarî û DY.

62 Di 2009î de Ibrahim Nabavi, satîrîstê îranî yê navdar, neliheviyên di siyaseta dewleta Îranê ya derbarê mislimanên li dinyayê eşkere kir. Nabavi, derheqê bêdengiya rejima Îranê li hemberî zextên Çînê li ser kêmara xwe ya misliman, wiha nivîsandibû:

Berevaniya mislimanên li Almanya, Îtalya [û li welatên din î Ewropaya Rojava] mecburiyeteke dînî ye. Ji ber ku ew in, ku ji Îranê, Iraqê, Tirkiyeyê û Sûriyeyê bo jiyana xwe reviyane… Ger ew misliman dixwazin bimrin bila vegerin welatên xwe… Meseleya mislimanên çînî parçeyek ji meseleyên navxweyî yê Çînê ye. Ji ber ku zêdetirî hezar sal in mislimanên çînî welatê xwe neterikandine û ew tenê li welatê xwe tên kuştin. Dîsa, em nikarin îtiraz bikin li komkujiya ku Rusya li Çeçenyayê dike ji ber ku em ê têkilî meseleyên wan î navxweyî nebin. Ew misliman li Rusyayê jî najîn; li welatekî din dijîn… Em bê şert û merc hemû mislimanên kuştî piştî koça wan a bo welatekî Ewropaya Rojava, wek Almanya, diparêzin. http://www.roozonline.com/persian/tanssatire/tans-satire-article/archive/2016/july/12/article/- bc1127ea53.html. Hat dîtin: 10/01/2016.

63 Hassan al-Banna, “Our Message”.

64 Bo pirtûkek balkêş derbarê neteweperweriya misliman di destpeka sedsala 20mîn de li Hindistanê, bnr. Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

65 Muhammad Iqbal, Stray Reflections (Iqbal Academy, 1910), 35.

66 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 8.

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