DI NAVBERA NETEWEPERWERÎ Û MAFÊN JINAN DE: Tevgera Jinên Kurd li Iraqê (1)

DI NAVBERA NETEWEPERWERÎ Û MAFÊN JINAN DE:

Tevgera Jinên Kurd li Iraqê:[1]

NADJE AL-ALI Û NICOLA PRATT JI ÎNGILÎZÎ: FEXRIYA ADSAY

Puxte: Ev gotar bi riya vekolandina tevgera jinên kurd ên li Iraqê, ku kêm hatiye lêkolînkirin, li ser aliyekî mîkro-polîtîkayên ‘Iraqa nû’ disekine. Bi saya hevpeyvînên bi jinên çalakger ên li Hewlêr û Silêmaniyê, di ser pêwendiya neteweperweriya kurdî û femînîzmê re em çalakî, stratejî û armancên wan ên ji 2003yan vir de pênase û analîz dikin. Em nîqaşên di nav jinên çalakger de, ji têgînkirina neteweperwerî û femînîzmê an ji çarçoveyên dijber an lihev ên bo van çalakgeran bêtir, wek hewldanên ‘vegotin’a neteweya kurd bi taybetî wek bersiva realîteyên ‘Iraqa nû’ fam dikin. Em îdia dikin ku li Kurdistana Iraqê neteweperwerî bi serê xwe li ber mafên jinan ne asteng e. Berevajî vê, heta vêga ev kêmasiya çalakgerên jin bû ku li ser bêpêwendîtiya navbera netewe û dewletê disekinîn ku dikare rê li ber serkeftinên têkoşîna wan bigire.

Peyvên sereke: Iraq, neteweperweriya kurd, tevgera jinan, partiyên siyasî.

Destpêk

Yek ji mijarên ku di lîteratura derbarê Iraqê de ji aliyê dîrokî ve û bo ‘Iraqa nû’ hatiye îhmalkirin rola jinan û zayendê ye. Gelek ji lîteratura îro li ser meseleyên makro-siyasî û siyasî-stratejîk ên wek tundî, rola DYAyê di pêvajoyên siyasî yên pişt-dagirkeriyê, neft, nûkirinên makezagonî û federalîzm, an ew tiştên ku Koma Qeyranê ya Navneteweyî wek dabeşkirina desthilatdarî û çavkaniyan xulase dikin (International Crisis Group, 2008), hûr dibe. Bi gelemperî ev têkoşîn wek ku di nav bijarteyên siyasî û leşkerên wan de derbas dibe, tê nîşandan. Lê, biryar û kirinên siyasetmedar û komên çekdar, girêdayî qabiliyeta wan a bi riya sazkirina ramanên etno-neteweperwerî an nasnameyên olî seferberkirina nifûza sivîl e ku projeyên wan ên siyasî destek bikin. Di vê seferberkirinê de ramanên derbarê pêwendiyên zayendî yên ‘guncav’ ciyekî girîng zevt dikin û di asta lokal de di nav jinan (û mêran) de ji bo berxwedan an cîgirtinê qadên nû vedike. Ji ber ku jin siyasetên zayendî û etno-neteweyî yên ‘Iraqa nû’ muzakere dikin, ev gotar ji bo famkirina van mîkro-siyasetan, çalakî, stratejî û armancên jinên kurd ên li Iraqê analîz dike.

Me bala xwe da nîqaşên li ser pêwendiya neteweperwerî û femînîzmê da ku em çalakgeriya jinên kurd ên Iraqê analîz bikin. Mijara ku gelo neteweperwerî û femînîzm li hev dikin an dijberên hev in, di nav zanayên femînîst de bûye kaniya nîqaşan (Anthias and Yuval Davis 1989; Cockburn 1998; Jayawardena 1986; Yuval Davis 1997, 2004

, 2004, yên din). Gelek femînîst, bi taybetî li Ewrûpa û Amerîkaya bakur, neteweperweriyê wek dijbera armanc û têkoşînên femînîst dibînin (Cockburn 2007: 192–202). Li aliyekî din, di peywendên kolonyal û post/neokolonyal de, wêneyê derdikeve holê bêtir têkel e. Yek, ji ber li Rojhilata Navîn demxexwarina femînîzmê, têgehên ‘femînîst’ an ‘femînîzm’ê kêm caran tên emilandin û jin ji bo pênasekirina armancên çalakgeriya xwe navlêkirinên curbicur bi kar tînin (al-Ali 2000: 47). Li vir, em behsa wan jinên ku wek çalakgerên mafên ‘jinan’ têdikoşin da ku di qada giştî de rola jinan zêdetir bibe, ji bo jinan bêtir çavkanî û/an derfet bên dayin an dawî li ferqîyetên di zagonçêkirinê de bînin, dikin. Du, li Rojhilata Navîn em dibînin di tecrûbeyên derbarê pêwendiya navbera ‘femînîzm’ û ‘neteweperwerî’yê de çeşîddariyek heye. Sophie Richter-Devroe (2009) destnîşan dike ku piraniya jin û mêrên filistînî ne alîgirên siyaset û helwestên femînîst in ku wan wek dijberî têkoşîna wan a bo mafên filistîniyan dibînin. A din, xebata Frances Hasso ya derbarê Cepheya Demokratîk a bo Rizgariya Filistînê de destnîşan dike ku di nav peywendeke ku ji têkoşîna leşkerî bêtir, seferberiya girseyî stratejiya sereke ya tevgerê ye û îdeolojiya tevgerê wekheviya jinan wek nîşandêra modernbûna tevgerê destek dike, netewe-perwerî dikare failbûn û xurtbûna jinan hêsantir bike (Hasso 1998).

Lê, li Rojilata Navîn, em gelek caran dibînin ku neteweperwerî bi ol re li hev hatiye badan û li hemberî ramana ‘rizgariya’ jinan a di nav paradîgmaya modernîst de, disekine. Mînak, tevgerên îslamî ku qaşo li hember rejîmên otorîter ên sekuler û/an dagirkeriya biyaniyan radibin, gelek caran piştevaniya qaîdeyên mihafezekar dikin, wek sernixumandina jinan û li gor şîroveyên mihafezekar nûkirina zagonên malbatî, di heman demê de jî jinan wek parçeyek ji van tevgeran seferber dikin (Moghadam 1994). Ji aliyekî ve jî, Margot Badran dide xuyakirin ku femînîstên misrî yên sedsala bîstemîn di çarçoveya îslamê de xebitîne û daxwaza neteweyî bi pêş xistine (Badran 1995). Shahrzad Mojab (2004, 2009), di nav peywenda kurdên Iraqê de behsa doza neteweyî dike û dibêje ku tevgerên îslamî-neteweperwerî û neteweperweriya sekuler her du jî rê li ber siyaseteke zayendî ya veguherîner digirin û li hember tundî û newekheviyên kok-zayendî ji analîz û têkoşîneke femînîst re dibin asteng.

Li Iraqê, ku dewleteke pir-neteweyî û pir-olî ye, neteweperweriya dewletî parçebûn û sekteryanîzma neteweyî dijwar dike û bo berxwedan û dijberiya li hember dagirkirina bi serkêşiya DYAyê û, hin caran, ji 2003yan vir de li hember çendîn hikûmetan katalîzoreke girîng bû (al-Ali and Pratt 2009). Lê, ji mêj ve ye neteweperweriya Iraqê ji aliyê siyasî, aborî û çandî ve kurdên ku ji 1923yan û vir ve ku bi dewleta Iraqê ve hatine girêdan, marjînalîze kirine. Neteweperweriya Iraqê, rê li ber çalakgerên mafên jinan girtine û bi teqlîdkirina ‘rojeva rojavayî’, bi xayînbûna bi neteweyê re û bênirxkirina meseleyên siyasî ‘yên girîngtir’ hatine tawanbarkirin. Ev tawanbarkirin ji destpêka sedsala bîstemîn ve, ne tenê li Iraqê, musalatî femînîst û femînîzma li Rojhilata Navîn bûye.

Dibe ku cureyê ‘femînîzm”ê an ‘mafên jinan’ girîng be di pênasekirina pêwendiya wê ya bi neteweperweriyê re. Çalakgerên mafên jinan ku bi riya perwerdehî û îstihdamê, daxwazên xwe li ser derxistina jinan a bo qada giştî kom dikin, dikarin gelek caran bi daxwazên neteweperwer ên bo ‘modernîzekirin’a neteweyê li hev bikin wek ku Frances Hasso (1998) ev rewş di Cepheya Demokratîk a bo Rizgariya Filistînê tespît kiribû. Lê, çalakgeriya mafên jinan ku li ser meseleyên wek tundiya li hember jinan an zagonên malbatî hûr dibe, dikare bêtir bi şerekî dijwartir rû bi rû bimîne, ji ber ku serkêşên şerê neteweyî çawa ku bo serweriya welatê xwe têdikoşin bo serweriya neteweya xwe jî têdikoşin. Ev têkoşîna kontrolkirinê bi sazkirina nasnameyên neteweyî jî ku tevgerên neteweyî seferber dikin re eleqedar e. Partha Chatterjee dibêje elîtên neteweperwer nasname û çandeke neteweperwer a ‘otantîk’ ku ji ya Rojava ciyawaz e saz dikin. Ev ciyawazî di qada çandê de û, girêdayî vê, qada taybet a pêwendiyên zayendî de tê bicîkirin, ne di ‘qada derve’ ya teknolojî, aborî an leşkerî de (ku Rojava her tim dikare raseriya xwe îdia bike) (Chatterjee 1993).

Herwiha, hewldanên bo afirandina nasnameyên neteweyî yên ‘otantîk’ sazkirina qaîdeyên zayendî yên taybet divê. Di peywenda kurdên li Iraqê, ciyawazî bi iraqiyên ereb û bi Rojava re eleqedar tê sazkirin. Wek ku ev gotar jî destnîşan dike, ev rewş di helwestên siyasetmedarên kurd yên di warê têkoşîna mafên jinan a li başûrê Kurdistanê[2] rê li ber paradoksan vedike. Ev jî heye, ne tenê elîtên neteweperwer (ên mêr) nasnameyên neteweyî saz dikin, lê mirovên asayî jî daxilî “vegotina neteweyê’ dibin (Bhahba 1994: 145). Em li vir nîqaş dikin ku çalakgerên bo mafên jinan ên li başûrê Kurdistanê bi riya daxwazên xwe yên di warê mafên taybet û çavkaniyan de daxilî ‘vegotina neteweyê’ dibin. Ber bi dawiyê ve, ev gotar armanc û çalakiyên jinên li başûrê Kurdistanê ne tenê wek hewldanên ku mafên jinan daxwaz dikin lê wek mînakên dirûvgirtina neteweperweriya kurd û mafên jinan jî di ber çavan re derbas dike.

Ev gotar bingeha xwe ji 60 hevpeyvînên nîv-binyadkirî (semi-structured) ku di bihara 2007an û payiza 2010an de di nav çalakgerên civaka sivîl, siyasetmedar û profesyonelên li Hewlêr û Silêmaniyê hatine kirin, digire. Hemû jinên ku gotinên wan hatine bikaranîn, ger bi awayekî din nehatibe nîşandan, nivîskaran bi xwe bi wan re hevpeyvîn kirine û navên wan nehatine eşkerekirin. Ji bo pêşkêşkirina lêkolîneke bi kûrahî ya rewşa tevgera jinan li başûrê Kurdistanê em ji van hevpeyvînan îstifade dikin û beyanatên wan di nav pêwendiya bi neteweperweriya kurd û femînîzm/ daxwazên mafên jinan analîz dikin. Di pêvajoya vê lêkolînê de em bi jinên ku endamên parlamentoya Kurdistanê ne an di nav yekîtiyên jinan de ne ku girêdayî partiyên siyasî yên sereke ne, peyivîn: Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê (PDK), serokê wê Mesûd Barzanî ye, li Hewlêr û dora wê xurt e, Yekîtiya Niştimanperwer a Kurdistanê (YNK) serokê wê Celal Talabanî, serokkomarê Iraqê ye, li Silêmaniyê û dora wê xurt e. Jinên çalakger ên din ku em bi wan re peyivîn û bi partiyên siyasî re eleqedar bûn, ji Partiya Komunîst a Kurdistanê, Yekîtiya Îslamî ya Kurdistanê û Partiya Neteweyî ya Asûriyan bûn. Em bi jinên ku damezirêner an beşdarên yek ji çendîn komeleyên sivîl in jî peyivîn, ên wek Rêxistina Jinan, Rêxistina Perî, el-Amal, Rêxistina Bayê Hêviyê û Rêxistina Xurtkirina Jinan –hemû li Hewlêrê ne; û Rêxistina Asûde ya bo Şerkirina bi Tundî ya li Hember Jinan, Rêxistina Geşedana Civakî ya Kurdistanê, Rêxistina Geşedana Sivîl, Rêxistina Ghassem, Navenda Jinan a Rewanê, Hêlîna Zarokan, Navenda Geşedena Demokrasî û Mafên Mirovan, Navenda Neteweyî ya bo Lêkolînên Zayendî li Silêmaniyê, û ji bilî van parêzer û rojnamegerên jin.

Ev jinên çalakger beşdarî gelek çalakiyên wek alîkariya refah û însanî; perwerdehî û gihandin; weşan û rojnamegerî; projeyên geşedanê; siyaset; xizmetên alîkariya zagonî; piştgirî û parastina qurbanên tundî ya binyad-zayendî; û lobiya siyasî ya derbarê mafên jinan de, dibin. Li bajaran çalakgerên jin di rêxistinên civaka sivîl de baş tên temsîlkirin, di nav partiyan de kêmtir tên temsîlkirin. Piraniya van jinan bajarî ne û ji çîna navîn in û ne mecbûr in ku raman an daxwazên jinên gundewar û/an çîna karker temsîl bikin (Mojab 2009; Fischer-Tahir 2010: 1391). Ji mêj ve piraniya jinên kurd ên çalakger ên bo mafên jinan di nav çarçoveyeke sekuler de dixebitin. Di nav peywenda ku piştî dagiriyê partî û tevgerên îslamî li Iraqa navendî û başûr roleke girîng leyistin, redkirina îslama siyasî di navbera nasnameya kurd û ereb de bû unsûreke girîng a ciyawaziyê. Lê çalakgerên mafên jinan ên îslamî yên kurd çêbûn û bi piranî li hemberî partiyên siyasî (PDK û YNK) ne, ku tê bawerkirin her diçe dikevin nav gendeliyê û ji daxwaz û pêdiviyên gel dûr dikevin. Ji aliyê din ve, jinên kurd ên îslamî çalakgeriya xwe ya siyasî wek tevkariya bidestxistina mafên kurdan didin nasandin û di nav çarçoveyeke etno-neteweperwer de ku li hemberî neteweperweriya Iraqê an çarçoveya netewebuhêr a îslamî dixebitin.

Jinên kurd û têkoşîna bo mafên kurdan û jinan berî û piştî 2003yan

Bi dehan sal in ku jinên kurd ên li Iraqê bo mafên kurdan di nav şer de ne. Lê, heta sala 1991ê, têkoşîna wan ji rojeveke taybet-zayendî bêtir bi piranî derbarê bidestxistina mafên neteweyî de bû (Mojab 1996, 2000, 2003). Ji ber vê hin lêkolîneran îdia dikirin ku neteweperweriya kurdî bêyî ku pêwendiyên bavsalarî yên civaka kurd veguherîne jin seferber kirine (Mojab 2004; Begikhani 2003). Di 1991ê de çêkirina ‘herêma ewle’ derfet da damezirandina rêxistinên nû yên siyasî, vegera jinên hatibûn nefîkirin, damezirandina rêxistinên navneteweyî RCS (NGO) û afirandina mekan û derfetên nû bo jinên kurd ku rojeva mafên jinan pêk bînin (Mojab 2004; Begikhani 2005: 223; al-Ali 2007: 205–208).

Lê, destkeftiyên jinên kurd ên li herêma ewle bi temamî ne erênî bûn. Piştî hilbijartinên sala 1992yan, ji 105 endamên parlamentoyê 5 kes jin bûn (Mojab 2004: 119). Serokatiyên her du partiyan hewl dan bi serokeşîran re tevkariyê bikin û piştî 1992yan li Kurdistana Iraqê rê li ber eşîrvaniyeke nû vekirin (McDowall 2000: 385). Di nav vê peywendê de, gelek caran bi guman li hewldanên jinan dihate nerîn û heta bi awayekî çalak ji aliyê aktorên siyasî yên mêr ve dihatin astengkirin (Mojab 2004; al-Ali 2007: 207). Di Gulana 1994an de PDK û YNK li dij hev rabûn şer, di sala 1999an de başûrê Kurdistanê dabeş bû û bi sedan xortî jiyana xwe ji dest da. Di heman demê de, komên îslamî yên kurd bi piştevaniya Îranê îslamîzasyona civaka kurd armanc dikirin, bûn xwedî nifûz (Mojab 2004: 129). Gelek jinên kurd di sala 1994an de di navbera Silêmanî û Hewlêrê de bi daxwaza aşitî û lihevkirina her du partiyan meşiyan. Lê heyf e ku, jinên kurd jî di rê de wek dabeşbûna siyasî û îdarî ya başûrê Kurdistanê parçe bûn.

Piştî afirandina herêma ewle ji bo gelek jinên çalakger meseleyeke girîng zêdebûna kuştinên namûsê û sûcên din ên li hemberî jinan bûn ku ji aliyê Shahrzad Mojab (2003) wek ‘zayendkujî’ dihat binavkirin. PDK û YNK her duyan jî zordariya li ser jinan, kuştinên namûsê jî tê de, wek parçeyek ji ‘çanda eşîrvanî û îslamî’ pênase dikirin (Mojab 2004: 122). Ev madeyîkirina çand û kevneşopa kurdan mînakeke sereke ya meyla dîrokî û pir-çandî ye ku di têkoşîn û pêvajoyên neteweperweriyê de mijarên derbarê jin û zayendan ji bo sazkirina nasnameyên neteweyî yên ‘otantîk’ tên bikaranîn (Yuval Davis 1997).

Jinên kurd ên çalakgerên bo mafên jinan digel zehmetiyên ku rû bi rû diman ji bo îptalkirina hukmên di zagona cezayê de ku kuştina jinan li ser navê ‘namûs’ê xweş dibînin, seferber bûn. Di sala 2000î de li herêmên di bin kontrola YNKê de û di sala 2002an de li herêmên di bin kontrola PDKê de di bicîanîna van guhertinan de serkeftî bûn. Digel van guherînan, cezakirina sûcên namûsê kêm bû (Amnesty International 2009). Jinên kurd ên çalakgerên bo mafên jinan ji bo reformkirina zagona derbarê malbatê de ya sala 1959an lobî kirin da ku di warê zewac û hevberdanê de bêtir wekhevî çê bibe. Li herêma di bin kontrola YNKê de Celal Talabanî Pêşniyaznameya 62 (2000), dikir ku bo zilamên ji yekê bêtir jin bînin heta sê salan cezayê hepsê û 10,000 dînar jî cezayê pereyan bê dayin, îmze kir. Lê çawa ku zagona derbarê kuştinên namûsê de hate piştguhkirin, tetbîqkirina Pêşniyaznameya 62yan jî bi îstiqrar nebû.

Bi qewla Shahrzad Mojab, di navbera 1991 û 2003yan de jinên li herêma ewle nedihat wê wateyê ku ji ber sûcên ‘namûs’ê an awayên din ên dîskrîmînasyonê ewle bûn (2004). Li gor Mojab, di vê dewrê de di navbera neteweperwerî, ol û hêza mêran a eşîrî-feodal’ de tifaqek hebû (Mojab 2004: 130). Lê, Mojab didomîne, ‘… di heman demê de, ev tifaq bû sedema berxwedana jin û mêrên ku li Kurdistanê serê xwe bi demokratîzekirina pêwendiyên zayendî re diêşandin (Mojab 2004: 130). Bi gotineke din, xurtbûna hêzên neteweperwer ên mihafezekar û tevgera jinan, du aliyên neteweperweriya kurd in. Di hebûna herêma ewle de ji bo jinên kurd qadeke siyasî vebû ku neteweperweriya kurdî ji nû ve pênase bikin da ku bêtir cî bide (hin) jinan û daxwazên wan. Di sala 2003yan de têkçûna rejîma Beasî li başûrê Kurdistanê, ji bo gel bû sedema hêsabûnê, lê entegrasyona başûrê Kurdistanê ya bi Iraqê re meseleyên wekî din derxistin pêş û di nav jinên çalakger de rê li ber fikrên veqetîner vekir. Meseleyên ku em li vir nîqaş dikin ev in: Pêwendiyên navbera jinên çalakger û Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê (HHK); pîvandina pêşveçûna wekheviya zayendî; û bersivên bo makezagonê, pêwendiya navbera başûrê Kurdistanê û Iraqê. Nerînên cuda yên jinên çalakger ên derbarê van meseleyan de, binê xala ku li ‘Iraqa nû’ hewce nake femînîzm û neteweperwerî ji hev bitengijin, xêz dikin, lê bêtir li ser awayê neteweperweriya kurdî û li ser pêwendiya di navbera dewleta Iraqê û neteweya kurd de, pevçûn heye.

Jinên çalakger ên bo mafên jinan û Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê

Li jor, me destnîşan kir ku gelek jinên çalakger neteweperweriya kurd ji bo geşedana tevgera jinên kurd erênî dibînin. Lê, geşedana tevgera jinên di nav çarçoveya têkoşîna neteweperwer de û hakimiyeta YNK û PDKê ya di vê têkoşînê de dike ku rêxistinên civaka sivîl ên li başûrê Kurdistanê, piraniya wan, nikaribin bi serê xwe hebin û xwedî piştevaniya aborî, siyasî û parastina yek ji van partiyên siyasî bin. Li HHKê piraniya çalakî, rêxistin, xebat û faaliyetên jinan ji aliyê yek ji partiyên siyasî yên sereke, bi taybetî PDK an YNKê tên sponsorkirin (al-Ali û Pratt 2009).

Ji 2003yan ve, serdestiya partiyên siyasî ya li ser civaka sivîl her ku diçe bêtir dibe mesele ji bo jinên çalakger. Şîlan A., li Hewlêrê bo rêxistineke jinan a serbixwe dixebite, di sala 2007an de di hevpeyvînekê de gazinên xwe dikir:

Ewên wek me ku ji aliyê partiyên siyasî nayên piştevanîkirin têkoşîna bo bihîstina dengê xwe dikin. Dema rojevên din ên siyaseta neteweyî yên derbarê serxwebûna kurdan de şerê derbarê Kerkuk û federalîzmê de her tim girîngtir tên dîtin, zehmet e ku mirov li ser pirsgirêkên jinan hûr bibe.

Ev gazin ji aliyê gelek jinên çalakger ên din hatine kirin û xuya ye ji Îlona 2010an vir ve ji ber serneketina çareseriya Kerkukê û herêmên nîqaşbar ên di navbera ereb û kurdan de ev gazin dihatin dupatkirin.

Hin jinên çalakger digotin ku ‘rojeva siyaseta neteweyî’ xisarê dide mafên jinan, jinên din jî, taybetî ewên girêdayî partiyên siyasî ne, digotin her du mesele jî wek hev girîng in. Mînak Riham Q., endameke hilbijartî ya başûrê Kurdistanê û alîgira seferberiya mafên jinan ên wekhev di warê medenî de, di Nîsana 2007an de di hevpeyvînekê de digot, ‘Armanca min Kurdistaneke demokratîk, sekuler û bidestxistina Kerkukê ye; da ku em xwedî civakeke sivîl bin û pirsgirêkên jinan fam bikin.’

Me dît ku gelek jinên kurd ên çalakger ku girêdayî yek ji partiyên siyasî yên sereke ne hê jî bi guman li hevdu dinerin, digel ku PDK û YNKê di sala 2002an de li hev kirin û di bin Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê (HHK) de hêzên xwe kirin yek. Peydabûna mixalefeteke cidî ya bi navê tevgera ‘Goran’ (an Tevgera bo Guherîna Demokratîk), ku di sala 2008an de li Silêmaniyê ji aliyê endamên kevn ên YNKê hate damezirandin, derbarê ku çalakgerên girêdayî partiyên siyasî yên sereke çawa bi yên din re eleqedar dibin, hin bandor kirin. Goran, ji partiyên siyasî yên îslamî bêtir dikarî yekdestiya hêza siyasî ya her du partiyan xira bike. Jinên çalakger ên nêzî PDK û YNKê xwe ji aliyê çalakger û siyasetmedarên reformîst derbxwarî didîtin, digel ku hin jinên em pê re dipeyivîn îdia dikirin ku tevgera Goran bi bûyîna partiyeke siyasî û cîgirtina di nav siyaseta formel de wê tûjbûna xwe winda kiriye. Di sala 2010an de di nav jinên ku em bi wan re dipeyivîn girîngiya tevgera Goran dihate axaftin û di navbera jinên derdora du partiyên siyasî yên sereke de kêmtir tengijîn hebû lê di navbera jinên ku di nav hikûmetê û parlamentoyê de û yên di nav rêxistinên civaka sivîl de dixebitîn bêtir tengijîn hebû.

Di destkeftiyên wekheviya zayendî de pîvandina pêşveçûnê

Heta radeyekê, pêwendiyên di navbera jinên çalakger û HHKê ji aliyê nerînên wan ên li ser destkeftiyên partiyên siyasî/HHKê yên derbarê wekheviya zayendî de şêwe digire. Hin jin, bi taybetî yên ji partiyên siyasî ne, bawer dikin ku li başûrê Kurdistanê partiyên siyasî di xurtkirina mafên jinan de roleke mezin dilîzin. Wek mînak, Nazdar S., ku demekê ji bo serxwebûna Kurdistanê şervaneke pêşmerge bû û piştre di Yekîtiya Jinên Kurdistanê ya girêdayî PDKya Mesûd Barzanî de bû şexseke berbiçav, wisa digot:

Ez bi tiştên ku me ji 1991ê vir de kirine, serbilind im. Li Kurdistanê jin gelekî bi pêş de çûn û serokên me yên siyasî di alîkariya mafên jinan de roleke girîng lîstin. Wan di warê perwerdekirina jinan de, teşwîqkirina wan a bo xebatê û beşdarbûna nav siyasetê de piştgiriya me kir. Lê pirsgirêka me çand û kevneşop in. Hin jin ji profesorên zanîngehê bêtir li alimên oldar guhdar dikin. Divê em ji dibistanan dest pê bikin û di warê wekhevî û mafên mirovan de em zarokên xwe perwerde bikin. Digel hemû pirsgirêkên me, her roj ji roja berê baştir dibe û em bêtir modernîze dibin (al-Ali û Pratt 2009:143).

Gelek jinên çalakger destnîşan dikin ku di pêşxistina mafên jinan de meseleya kuştinên namûsê di nav serokên kurd ên siyasî de pîvaneke berpirsyariyê ye. Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê, ji herêmên Iraqê yên din cuda, ‘namûs’ wek sedemeke ku sûcê kuştinê sivik bike, ji nav zagonên xwe derxistiye. Dîsa jî, di çendîn hevpeyvînên di sala 2007an de, çalakgeran gazin dikirin ku tu kes ji ber kuştina merivên xwe yên jin nehatiye cezakirin. Çend çalakgerên em pê re peyivîn pratîkên olî û eşîrî û helwestên ‘paşverû’ wek astengên sereke yên li ber mafên jinan tawanbar dikirin. Yên din bi vê nerînê îqna nedibûn. Li gor jineke çalakger a bo mafên jinan li Hewlêrê:

Tawanbarkirina çandê tiştekî pir hêsan e. A rast, siyasetmedar kuştinên namûsê wek pirsgirêkeke malbatî dibînin. Belê, li gor makezagona kurdî ya nû kuştinên namûsê sûc in û divê bên cezakirin. Lê zagon nayên tetbîqkirin. Ji dêvla zagon û dadgehan, navbeynkariya malbatî û eşîriyê tercîh dikin, bîlhese, dema berjewendiyên siyasî û aborî di rîskê de bin (al-Ali û Pratt 2009: 144).

Em ligel vê analîza çalakgerê ya taybet in ku ji bo têkçûna di cezakirina kuştinên ‘namûsê’ de bê nixumandin ‘çand’ tê bikaranîn. Reqabeta siyasî ya di navbera herdu partiyan de û tayînkirina serokeşîr û serokên olî ya bi riya patronajê ku li başûrê Kurdistanê ciyê xwe girtiye (Leezenberg 2005) berpirsyariya hisabdayinê û edaletê têk dibe û ji dêvla ku pêwendiyên hiyerarşîk û bavsalar hilweşîne, wan ji nû ve hildiberîne.

Ew jinên ku di sala 2007an de li hember HHKê rexneyî bûn, di Îlona 2010an de, parlamento û hikûmeta berê bêtir erênî bi bîr dianîn. Gelek jinên çalakger ji parlamento û hikûmeta vê carê hêvîşikestî bûn, ku difikirîn taahudên gelekî girîngtir yên di warê mafên jinan de ku hikûmeta berê kiribû, neanîbûn cî (2006–2009). Li Hewlêrê jineke çalakger, Viyan A., digot:

Parlamento û hikûmeta dawî ji bo rewşa jinan xurtir bikin gelekî hewl dan. Di vê demê de ger propaganda be jî, peyameke zelal ji civatê re şandin ku ew jî ji mafên jinan bawer dikin. Di encumenê de komîteyeke taybet bo mafên jinan terxan kirin. Wezareta Karûbarên Jinan hebû. Û her çiqas zêde tiştek nekiribin jî, sinyalên baş didan. Li hember tundiya kok-zayendî seferberiyeke mezin a medyayî hebû. Di televizyonan de derbarê mafên jinan de gelek bername hebûn. Serokwezîr di vê mijarê de gelek beyanat didan. Û van hemûyan derî li gelek rêxistinên jinan vedikirin ku bixebitin û piştgiriyê bistînin.

Dema me li sedemên vê guherînê pirsî, bersiv ji pirsgirêkên aciltir ên wek ‘ewlekariya neteweyî’ heta meseleyên neçareserkirî yên otonomiya kurdan û rewşa Kerkukê rêz dibû. Lê, hin jinan ‘pirsgirêkên mezintir yên siyasî’ wek sedem nedidîtin û behsa kêmasiya sazûmanîbûniya derbarê meseleyên jin û zayendî de dikirin: ‘Hê jî gelek tişt girêdayî şexsan û niyeta pak a mirovine taybet in, ji dêvla saziyên rûniştî yên şefaf û domdar’ digot Sawsan G., ku qasî bîst salan e bi awayekî çalak li hember dîskrîmînasyona zayendî têdikoşe. Rêvebira kevn a Yekîtiya Jinên Kurdistanê ji me re digot ku siyasetmedarên mêr ên di asta rêvebiriyê de gelek caran piştgiriya bo mafên jinan tesdîq dikin, lê mêrên di astên nizimtir de bêtir ji fikrên derbarê jinan û guherînê de ditirsin. Hin jinên din jî heq didan hikûmetê an pesnê wê jî didan. Hesteke ku bi giştî dihate îfadekirin ew bû ku tişt gelek wexta wan digirin lê kirinên çê û hêvîdar di rê de bûn, wek çalakkirina Encumena Pirsgirêkên Jinan.

Pîvaneke din a serkeftina mafên jinan ku bo çalakgerên em pê re peyivîn girîng bû, mijara Makezagona başûrê Kurdistanê bû. Gelek çalakger, ji bilî endamên partiyên islamî yên Kurdistanê, digotin ji aliyê mafê jinan ve makezagona başûrê Kurdistanê ji ya Iraqê (a sala 2005an) çêtir e ji ber ku ew mecbûr nake ku îslamiyet bingeha qanûnçêkirinê be. Jinên kurd ên çalakger (ji xeynî endamên partiyên îslamî yên li başûrê Kurdistanê) bawer dikin ku emilandina îslamiyetê wek kaniya sereke ya qanûnçêkirinê mafên jinan xerantî nake. Ev jiholêrakirina pirjiniyê û di dabeşkirina mîratê de wekheviyê dihewînin. Derin J., parêzerek li Hewlêrê, di sala 2007an de wisa digot:

Di semînerekê de bi hin kesan re ketim minaqaşeyê ji ber ku digotin, ‘em nikarin vê bikin, ji ber ku li dijî ol û kevneşopên me ne’. Dibêjim, ji bo parastina jinan divê zagonên xurttir hebin. Ger ew ji bo mêran bikêr be, argumenta çandê li hember mafên jinan bi kar tînin. Ji bo guhertina zagonên derbarê mafên jinan de tevgerek heye lê bo bicîanîna wê têkoşînek divê ji me re.

Di havîna 2008an de, jinên çalakger li hemberî pêşniyaznameya HHKê ya ku zagona bo malbatê wê li gor îslamê çêbikira; tirsa wan ew bû ku bo destûrdayina zewaca pirjin û li dijî mafên jinan a bo mîratwergirtinê bê şîrovekirin (Khalil 2008). Elbet, zagona bo malbatê li Rojhilata Navîn û cîhana misilmanan gelek awayên wê hene. Di warê zewac, hevberdan, wesayeta zarokan û mîratê de şîroveyên gelek ji hev cuda hene, ji şîroveyên wehabî yên li Erebîstanê bigire heta Fasê ku zagona bo malbatê, moudawana li ser şîroveyên bêtir pêşverû û wekhevîxwaz ava bûye. Lewma, dema em dinerin li Iraqa başûr û navendî, ku şîroveyên mihafezekar her diçe zêde dibin û ji bo meşrûkirina pratîkên dîskrîmînator tên bikaranîn (al-Ali û Pratt 2009), heqê jinên kurd ên çalakgerên bo mafên jinan heye ku qaîdeyên îslamî û newekhevî û bêedaletiya civakî bikin yek.

Di Îlona 2010an de, dema jinên kurd ên çalakger ji bo Makezagona li başûrê Kurdistanê derbarê seferberiya wan a bo wekheviya zayendî, bi taybetî jî derbarê zagona bo malbatê de, nerîna wan hate xwestin, jin di nav xwe de bûn du parçe ka ev serkeftinek e bo wan ya na. Ji aliyekî ve, destkeftiyên wan ên nû çênebûn, wek qedexekirina pirjiniyê û wekheviya di mîratwergirtinê de. Lê, ji beşên din ên Iraqê cuda, jinên kurd qet nebe mewzûata berê ku wan digot ji madeya 41. a Makezagona Iraqê ku di warê meseleyên malbatî de û mafên wekhev ên bo hemû iraqiyan îptal kir û biryarên derbarê zewac, hevberdan, mîrat û wesayeta zarokan de li gor otorîteya serekên oldar dida, bêtir biedalet bû. Dîsa jî, gelek jinan destnîşan dikir ku ji bo bicîanîna van biryaran bêtir hewl lazim e. Wek ku li jor hate nîqaşkirin, ev ji sûcên namûsê bêtir ne li ber çavan e.

Jinên kurd û dawiya mayî ya Iraqê

Piştî 2003yan, rewş baştir bû. Berê, em ditirsiyan ku rejîma Beasî dikare her tim were. Wek em di girtîgehekê de bin. Piştî 2003yan, em êdî netirsiyan. Me dikarî bi jinên din ên Iraqê re bên ba hev. Konferans çêdibûn û ev baş bûn bo çêbûna tora ragihandinê. Me tecrûbeyên xwe ji hev re vedigotin û daxwazên yekbûyî formule dikirin.

Çîman A., ku bo RCSeyeke iraqî ya pêşveçûnê dixebitî, di hevpeyvîneke sala 2007an de, ji bo geşbûna mafên jinan behsa girîngiya xebata navbera komên etnîk û mezhebî dikir. Di sala 2003yan de têkçûna Pêşniyaznameya Hikûmeta Iraqê ya 137an ku hewl da zagona derbarê malbatê de têxin bin otorîteya serekên oldar, û serkeftina bo qebûlkirina kotaya ji sedî 25 a jinan di parlamentoyê de, hin mînakên serkeftinên bi vî rengî bûn. Çîman li dijî Makezagona Iraqê ya 2005an jî derdiket ku li hemberî mafê jinan bû, digel ku ji ber mercên wê yên bo otonomiya kurdan ya di nav pergala Iraqa federal de, ji aliyê partiyên siyasî yên kurdan jî hatibû qebûlkirin. Tişta bi taybetî bo Çîman û jinên din ên li Iraqê girîng bû Madeya 41ê bû, ku, wek Biryara 137, di warê zagona bo malbatê de mafên wekhev ên hemû iraqiyan, bêyî ku li ol û mezheban binere, tehdît dikir.[3]

Her çiqas hin rêxistinên jinên kurd û çalakgerên wek Çîman, tev li seferberiya bo Makezagona Iraqê, taybetî jî a derbarê Madeya 41ê de (a di warê malbatê de), dibûn, hejmareke mezin a jinên kurd ên çalakger bi Makezagona Iraqê re eleqedar nedibûn û ji dêvla vê, ew di Makezagona başûrê Kurdistanê de li ser mîsogerkirina mafên jinan hûr dibûn (al-Ali û Pratt 2009: 138).[4] Ev bêtir eşkere bû ku dema di Nîsana 2007an de ji aliyê hikûmeta navendî hate îlankirin ku jin nikarin bêyî wasiyekî mêr (mahrem) pasaportê derxin. Her çiqas di Makezagona Iraqê de tu made tunebû ku vê mecbûr bike, Makezagona Iraqê diyar dikir ku îslam kaniya sereke ya zagonçêkirinê ye û tu zagon nikare derkeve derveyî îslamiyetê. Partiyên îslamî yên mihafezekar jî li parlamentoya Bexdayê piraniyê pêk tînin, lewma ev destûr dide bo amadekirina mewzûat an siyaseta li ser bingeha şîroveyên mihafezekar yên olî.

Li navend û başûrê Iraqê serdestiya partiyên îslamî kir ku gelek kesên ku em pê re diaxivîn pê bihesin ku jinên iraqî di nav peywendên çiqas cuda de dijîn. Wek encam, piraniya jinên kurd di wê baweriyê de ne ku jinên din ên iraqî ji ên li Kurdistana Iraqê xwedî armancên cuda ne, lewma naxwazin bi wan re bixebitin. Amira S., ku li Silêmaniyê di RCS a navneteweyî de dixebite, dema di hevpeyvîna Nîsana 2007an de dipeyivî ji helwesta gelek jinên kurd ên çalakger re dibû tercuman:

Di Makezagona Iraqê de, qala rola şerîetê dikin, destûr didin zewaca pirjin. Li başûrê Iraqê, ev wek pirsgirêk nayê qebûlkirin. Tenê em li bakur di makezagonê de daxwaza mafên jinan dikin. Tenê partiyên kurdan li dû mafên jinan digerin. Jinên li başûr (ê Iraqê) li mafên xwe napirsin. An dibe ku mafên xwe dixwestin lê nikarîbûn bixwazin ji ber zexta zilaman. Li Silêmaniyê, em rastî mixalefeta li hemberî mafên jinan hatin lê tevgera jinan ji ber wan danexwarin.

Gelek nerînên jinên kurd ên derbarê têkoşînên jinên çalakger ên bo mafên jinan li navend û başûrê Iraqê ku bo mafên xwe yên qanûnî bi salan e têdikoşîn, ji agahiyên kûr bêtir xwe dispartin gotegotan (al-Ali û Pratt 2009).

Wek ku li jor jî hate destnîşankirin, jinên iraqî yên kurd ji bo daxwaz û rojeva xwe meyla wan li ser redkirina çarçoveya îslamî ye lê hejmareke zêde ya jinên ereb ên iraqî ku ya endamên yek ji partiyên îslamî ne an ji xwe jinên oldar in, berjewendiyên jinan di nav çarçoveya îslamî de diparêzin.

Hin jinên kurd rasterast îtiraz dikin ku bibin perçeyek ji Iraqê. Helîma I., li Silêmaniyê seroka RCSkê ku bo mafên zarokan dixebite di sala 2007an de di hevpeyvînekê de digot:

Bandora têkçûna Sadam Husên bo Kurdistanê erênî ye. Lê vêga rewş neyînî ye. Yek ji pirsgirêkan ev e ku em dîsa parçeyek ji Iraqê ne û di bin kontrola hikûmeta navendî de ne. Em ji bo Makezagona Kurd pir dixebitin da ku em ol û dewletê ji hev veqetînin, mafên jin û zarokan tê de cî bigirin. Vêga, em di bin tehdîda Makezagona Iraqê de ne.

Meseleya Kerkukê[5] ji bo gelek jinên çalakger, bi taybetî bo yên nêzî partiyên siyasî, sedema nelihevkirinê ye. Ji bo pêkhatina mafên kurdan, girêdana Kerkukê a bi ser kurdan ve wek meseleyeke navendî tê dîtin. Heta jinên li Kerkukê ku bi komên cuda yên etnîk û mezhebî re dixebitin jî girîngiya vê ku divê ereb û tirkmen jî qebûl bikin Kerkuk bajarekî kurdan e, dupat dikin.

Encam

Ji aliyê dîrokî ve digel tebîeta mihafezekar a piraniya herêma Kurdistanê, di seferberkirina jinan û piştgirîdana rolên wan ên derveyî malê de neteweperweriya kurd xwedî roleke mezin e. Piştî 1991ê, gelek jinên kurd xwe spartin tevgera neteweyî da ku rojeva mafên jinan bidin destpêkirin. Ji wê çaxê ve, bi piranî, çalakgeriya jinên kurd di nav çarçoveya demokratîzekirin û modernîzasyona başûrê Kurdistanê yê otonom de şêwe girt.

Di 2003yan de bi hilweşîna rejîma Beasî, gelek jinên kurd ên çalakger di destpêkê de tev li jinên çalakger ên iraqiyên din bûn da ku li temamê Iraqê mafên jinan bi pêş ve bibin. Lê ew tundiya ku navend û başûrê Iraqê da ber xwe û îslamîzasyona siyaseta wê derê bû sedem ku wek rêbaza parastina mafên jinan hemû keda xwe bo piştevaniya otonomiya başûrê Kurdistanê terxan bikin. Ligel vê, gelek çalakgerên kurd di wê meylê de ne ku, bi riya daxwazên xwe yên bo mafên jinan, (li hemberî tişta ku li dawiya mayî ya Iraqê wek kêmasiya daxwaza bo mafên jinan dibînin) ji ereban cuda ne. Heta ew jinên li Kurdistanê ku bawer dikin xebata hevpar a bi jinên din ên iraqî re girîng e jî, ji ber zehmetiyên rêwitiya nav Iraqê, vê pêk nayînin. Lê, hin jinên çalakger ên ji navend û başûrê Iraqê bo civîn û komxebatan tên Kurdistana Iraqê ji ber ku ev der ji dawiya mayî ya Iraqê gelekî ewletir e. Berawirdkirina bi dawiya mayî ya Iraqê re, di warê destkeftiyên wan ên li başûrê Kurdistanê hêviyên hin jinên kurd geş dikirin, ên din jî li hember siyasetmedarên li HHKê rexneyên xwe didomandin. Hin jinên çalakger di wê baweriyê de ne ku siyasetmedarên Kurdistanê, ji bo li ser ‘meseleyên mestir ên neteweyî’ yên Kerkuk, neft û federalîzmê kûr bibin mafên jinan marjînalîze dikin. Jinên din ên çalakger jî di wê baweriyê de ne ku li Kurdistanê ev meseleyên derbarê mafên kurdan de ji bidestxistina mafên jinan nikarin bên veqetandin. Dîsa jî, hem ên rexneyî hem ên xweşbîn bawer dikin ku hikûmeta Bexdayê divê hurmetê bike bo otonomiya Kurdistanê.

Derbarê pêwendiya navbera femînîzm û neteweperweriyê de, mînaka başûrê Kurdistanê nîşan dide ku tengijînên di navbera van ‘îzm’an nikare bi serê xwe bê çareserkirin: nêzîkbûneke hevbir (intersectional) û kûr jê re lazim e da ku di dewreke taybet de di nav peywendeke taybet de hemû tevlihevî û nuansên wê, tevî şêwegirtina hêzên civakî û siyasî ku partiyên siyasî û tevgerên jinan pêk tînin û cureyên neteweperwerî û femînîzmê ku ji aliyên cuda tên îfadekirin, bê famkirin. Li Kurdistanê cudatiyên di navbera jinên çalakger ne tenê di nîqaşên derbarê stratejiyên firehkirina mafên jinan de ne (navbera qebûlkirin û berxwedana dijî serdestiya YNK û PDK; tevkariya bi jinên din ên Iraqê re; û rola îslamê) lê derbarê nerînên cuda yên neteweperweriya kurd (li hemberî a wekhevîxwaz a bavsalarî) de ne jî.

Di nav çend dehsalên dawî de, her ku tevgera kurdan ji tevgera xwe-tayînkirinê, bi şerkirina li dijî hikûmeta Iraqê, tevî şerên dirêjkirî yên bi Iraqê re bo desthilatdarî û çavkaniyan, ber bi sazîbûna ‘nîv-dewlet’ê (Natali 2010) ve guherî, neteweperweriya başûrê Kurdistanê jî pê re veguherî. Bi vê veguherînê re, jinên çalakger ên li başûrê Kurdistanê berfirehkirina daxwazên xwe yên bo wekheviya zayendî domandin, ne wek mixalefeteke li dijî vê pêvajoyê lê wek parçeyek ji avakirina başûrê Kurdistanê. Lê, li başûrê Kurdistanê geşedanên piştî 2003yan ji bo çalakgerên bo mafên jinan aloziyek derxist. Kêmasiya tevkariyek sîstematîk û biîstiqrar bi qada polîtik a berfirehtir a ‘Iraqa nû’ re, û kombûna hemû çalakiyan di nav qada siyasî ya tengtir a başûrê Kurdistanê (Kurdistana Iraqê) de, dibe ku di demeke dirêj de ji ber jihevqutbûna dewlet û neteweyê ya li Iraqê, li hember jinên çalakger ên başûrê Kurdistanê bi paş de vegere. Makezagona Iraqê di gelek qadan de Makezagona Kurdistanê bê hukim dihêle û zagonên herêma Kurdistanê divê bi qaîdeyên Makezagona Iraqê re ku bi riya mewzûata ku biryara wê ji aliyê parlamentoya Bexdayê ve hatiye girtin, tê tetbîqkirin, lihev bin.[6] Ya din, baweriya jinên çalakger ya bi HHKê bo parastin û piştgirîdana wekheviya zayendî û edaleta civakî dibe ku di dahatûyê de bibe pirsgirêk. Jixwe ev diyar bû ku siyasetmedarên kurd meyla wan heye ji mafên jinan tawîz bidin da ku li deverên ji aliyê civakî ve mihafezekar in xwe bidin qebûlkirin û bi hikûmeta navendî ya Iraqê re di nav peywenda muzakereya meseleyên din ên siyasî de meseleyên zayendî dayînin aliyekî. Siyasetmedar li vir ji yên deverên din ên dinyayê, dawiya mayî ya Iraqê jî tê de, ne cudatir in.

Bi ser de, wek ku zanyarên femînîst jî li herêmê li gelek deveran tesbît kirine, rejîmên otorîter dibe ku rê li ber wekheviya zayendî û edaleta civakî vekin lê bi şertê ku ev zirarê nedin rejîm an statukoyê (Kandiyoti 1991; Joseph 1991, 2000; al-Ali 2007; al-Ali û Pratt 2009; Hasso 2011). Baweriyeke zêde bi qabiliyeta HHKê û partiyên sereke ya bo pêşdebirina mafên jinan, dikare tixûbên stratejiyên jinên kurd ên çalakger û îmkana serkeftinê bo demeke dirêj teng bike. Hevkariyeke nêztir a bi jinên çalakger û rêxistinên li navend û başûrê Iraqê dibe ku rê li ber tifaqên nû yên jinên çalakger ên li hemberî dewleta Iraqê û HHKê veke û wan xurttir bike, ne ku lawaz bike.

Rîskeke din a vê baweriya bi HHKê ji wê rastiyê tê ku tevgerên jinan ên herêmê di peywendên ku rêxistinên bo mafên jinan an rojevên wekheviya zayendî ji aliyê dewletê ve hatine tayînkirin, paşdeçûnên mezin tecrûbe kirine. Ji protestoyên mixalif û siyasî yên li başûrê Kurdistanê diyar e ku kêmasiya azadiya siyasî û gendeliyê baweriya bi HHKê lawaz kiriye. Jinên kurd ên çalakger û rêxistinên bo mafên jinan ger zêde nêzî partiyên siyasî yên di hikûmetê de bibin, wê têkevin nav rîska tevkariya bi rejimeke gendel re. Girîng e bê destnîşankirin ku li başûrê Kurdistanê her diçe bêtir jinên çalakger mesafeyê dixin navbera xwe û partiyên siyasî û dibin parçeyek ji tevgerên muxalif ên li hemberî gendeliyê û bo xizmetên çêtir, ku di dema nivîsandina vê gotarê de pêk dihatin. Ji vî alî ve, çalakgerên bo mafên jinan hin daxwazên sereke yên jinên ne-elît yên derbarê dabeşkirineke adil a çavkaniyên li başûrê Kurdistanê tînin ziman û li aliyê din wê patronaja ciyêxwegirtî jî ku alîkariya berdewama dîskrîmînasyona li dijî jinan dike, dihejînin.

Ev nivîs di sala 2011an de di kovara Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 4 de hatiye weşandin.

[1] Nivîskarên vê gotarê spasdar in bo ew du kesên bênav ku ev gotar di ber çavan re derbas kirine û şîroveyên xwe yên avakar pêşkeş kirine û bo handana wê Lina Xatib. Xebata li qadê ya bo vê gotarê ji aliyê tahsîsata British Academyê ya bo projeya ‘Jin, Zayend û Veguherîna Siyasî ya li Iraqê” hatiye birêvebirin.

[2] Ev bi îngilîzî ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’ bû lê di gelek ciyan de me, bi destûra nivîskarên wê, ew wek başûrê Kurdistanê wergerand. (wer.)

[3] Biryara 137, hewleke îslamiyên şiî yên mihafezekar bû da ku zagona di warê malbatî de ya heyî û nisbeten pêşverû (komek zagonên di derbarê zewac, hevberdan, wesayeta zarokan û mîratê de bû) bi şîroveyeke mihafezekar a hiqûqa îslamî re biguherînin. Jinên iraqî yên çalakgerên mafên jinan nehiştin ku ev biryar ji aliyê Desthilatdariya Koalisyona Demkî ve bê pejirandin. Lê, di Makezagona Iraqê de Madeya 41, armanc dike ku zagona derbarê malbatê de li gor herêm û mezhebên olî yên cuda biguherînin. Ev made hê jî di ber çavan re tê derbaskirin û ji bo piraniya siyasetmedarên iraqî ne mijareke pêşdetir e.

[4] Makezagona Iraqê ew deverên qanûnçêkirinê (legislation) ku întiqalî herêman (mînak, Herêma Hikûmeta Kurdistanê) dibûn û ên ji aliyê hikûmeta navendî ya li Bexdayê bihata birêvebirin xerantî dike. Ji bo bêtir agahiyên derbarê mafên jinan de, bnr. Brown (2005). Di Makezagona Iraqê de ol xwedî roleke mezin e.

[5] Meseleya Kerkukê, minaqeşeya li ser serweriya bajêr di navbera Hikumeta Herêma Kurdistanê û hikumeta navendî ya Iraqê, refere dike. Ji bo bêtir agahî derbarê vê û meseleyên din ên di navbera HHK û hikumeta navendî, bnr. Koma Qeyranê ya Navneteweyî 2008 (International Crisis Group).

[6] Madeya 13an ya Makezagona Iraqê diyar dike: ‘Yek: Li Iraqê ev Makezagon di ser hemû zagonan re ye û li hemû parçeyên Iraqê divê bêîstisna bê riayetkirin. Du, zagonên ku bi vê Makezagonê re ne lihev bin divê neyên çêkirin. Di makezagonên herêmî de an di deqên zagonî yên din de her çi deq be ku bi Makezagonê re ne lihev be, divê ew bêhukim bê hesibandin (http://www.mofa.gov.iq/documentfi les/IraqiConstitution.pdf ).

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